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INTRODUCTION

This article offers a new technique for analyzing and evaluating
competing interpretations of a legal text and applies that technique to one
of the most debated questions of modern constitutional interpretation:
the meaning of "searches" in the first clause of the fourth amend*Clinical Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1975, Dartmouth
College; J.D. 1981, Wayne State University. An abridged version of parts I-V was presented to
the Association of American Law Schools at theJanuary 1988 Annual Meeting as the winning
paper in the 1988 AALS Scholarly Paper Competition. (For an edited text of the ora.
presentation to the AALS, see In Search of Common Sense: A Linguistic Approach to the Fourth
Amendment, 32 U. Micu. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 46 (1988).) This article has benefitted greatly
from the careful reading and criticism earlier drafts have received from Joseph Grano, James
Boyd White, Yale Kamisar, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Jerold Israel, Peter Westen, Richard
Friedman, and Joshua Dressier. I also want to acknowledge the assistance of two professional
linguists: W. Josh Ard, who painstakingly reviewed the entire text of an earlier draft, and
Bruce Mannheim, who examined closely the section on the semantics of searching. The article
has its origin in an independent study supervised by Professor Grano when I was his student
seven years ago. The evolution of that student paper into this article is due in large part to the
moral and tangible support provided by Robert Abrams during his tenure as Associate Dean
and, later, Interim Dean of the Wayne State University Law School.
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ment.1 This technique is called the "common sense" approach because it
begins with a semantic analysis of the text in terms of the senses that the key
words have in everyday speech. Such analysis reveals a complex of
interlocked concepts that underlies the ability of speakers to recognize
meaningful uses of these words. The common sense approach then
examines competing interpretations of the legal text in terms of their
selection, modification, or rejection of these conceptual elements, which
linguists call semantic features. Differing interpretations can thus be
evaluated by comparing the meaningfulness of each to the meaning
generated by common sense understanding of the text.
This article does not claim that the common sense approach will lead
to the Grail sought by so many constitutional scholars: the "right answer" to
the question of what contested constitutional provisions mean. The quest
for the right answer focuses on the problem of authority: What, other than
the sheer assertion of power, makes a given interpretation authoritative?
The common sense approach asks a different question: Is the interpretation meaningful, does it make sense? We can and must answer this question
before addressing issues of authority. If we cannot understand what an
interpretation means, we can hardly debate its correctness. Even more
fundamentally, law that cannot be understood well enough to apply
prospectively to order social action ceases to be law at all and becomes
merely the ad hoc dictates of persons who occupy positions of authority at
a particular point in time.
The current state of fourth amendment law is a powerful example of
the need for meaningful interpretation. In the past four years the Supreme
Court has had to decide whether the following government actions were
searches for purposes of the fourth amendment: (1) tracking the movements of a drum of chemicals by monitoring radio signals from a transmitter hidden within the drum; 2 (2) entering private fenced farmland to find
a hidden marijuana garden; 3 (3) viewing the backyard of a home from 1000
feet in the air; 4 (4) taking high resolution aerial photographs of an open-air
chemical plant; 5 (5) picking up a stereo turntable and looking at the serial

number on the bottom;6 and (6) peering
into a barn interior with a
7
flashlight to see an illicit drug laboratory.

1. The fourth amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Co.sr. amend. IV (emphasis added).
2. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
3. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
4. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
5. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
6. See Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (1987).
7. See United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1137-38 (1987).

A SEARCH FOR COMMON SENSE

These six cases provoked startling dissension among the members of
the Court. No one Justice joined the majority opinion in all six cases, 8 and
all but three joined harsh dissents in at least one case. 9 The inability of the
current Court to agree consistently on what "search" means in the fourth
amendment is mirrored by a universal complaint from the scholarly
community that this area of fourth amendment law does not make sense.10
A semantic analysis of "search" reveals three distinct senses with
differing conceptual structures: (1) to make a search of something, (2) to
search for something, and (3) to search out something. The text of the
fourth amendment is ambiguous as to which of these senses is the
appropriate meaning of "search," although "search of" at first appears to be
the most obvious choice. A series of cases involving electronic eavesdropping, beginning in 1928,12 first forced the Supreme Court to confront this
ambiguity, because listening cannot be described as a search of something.
Using the conceptual categories derived from semantic analysis, four
competing interpretations can be identified that developed out of these
'Just listening" cases and continue to dominate fourth amendment law
today.1 These four interpretations are (1) the search of interpretation; (2)

8. Former ChiefJustice Burger did join all four majority opinions issued while he was on
the Court. See Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 229; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209; Karo, 468 U.S. at
706; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 172. Justice Scalia authored one of the two decisions issued since his
appointment, see Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1151, and joined the second with only a minor concurring
objection, see Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1141.
9. Dissents were authored by Justice Stevens in Karo, 468 U.S. at 728, Justice Marshall in
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 184, Justice Powell in Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215, and Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1155,
Justice O'Connor in Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1157, and Justice Brennan in Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1142.
10. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 349
(1974) ("For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme
Court's most successful product."); Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REv. 1289, 1310 (1981) ("The [Court's] approach is at best
"); Burkoff, When Is a Search Not a "Search?" FourthAmendment Doublethink, 15
confusing ..
U. TOL. L. REv. 515, 523, 525 (1984) ("[T]here is, in 1984, unceasing, often vitriolic,
controversy among and between the justices of the Supreme Court over... the interpretation
and application of fourth amendment principles. . . . [Judicial doublethink is becoming
commonplace in the Supreme Court in this setting .... ); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and
the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lauyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973) ("The fourth
amendment cases are a mess!"); Goldberger, Consent, Expectationsof Privacy, and the Meaning of
"Searches" in the FourthAmendment, 75 J. C.Riu.L. & CRmimoLoyY 319, 323-24 (1984) ("Today, it
is common to find scholarly discussion of Supreme Court 'search' cases that is highly alarmist
in tone."); Grano, Supreme Court Review: Forward-PerplexingQuestions About Three Basic Fourth
Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMtINOLOGY 425, 462, 463 (1978) ("A frustrated court once lamented that it would
take the mind of a medieval scholastic to unwind the Supreme Court's search and seizure cases.
... [A] radical overhaul is required, unless we choose to accept the inconsistencies and forego
the goal of analytic coherence.").
11. See infra text accompanying notes 28-48.
12. See Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. The development of these four interpretations is discussed in Part V, infra text
accompanying notes 99-167, and the continued influence of these competing interpretations
in modern fourth amendment law is explored in Part VII, infra text accompanying notes
257-389.
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the search out interpretation; (3) the intrusion interpretation; and (4) the
policy interpretation.
The search of interpretation assumes that "searches" in the first clause
of the amendment can only mean a search of a person, house, papers, or
effects. If a challenged government action, such as just listening, cannot be
described literally in these terms, then it is not a search.
The search out interpretation allows "search out" to be one of the
senses of "search" if the object of the verb is a secret that is disclosed and
thereby affected by the searching out. Under this interpretation the object
of searching out must not merely be hard to find; it must have been
deliberately secret prior to the successful government search.
The intrusion interpretation modifies the semantic features of "search
of" to replace "search" with "intrusion." If a challenged action can be
described as an intrusion into a sacred area, such as a house or personal
effects, then it is a search.
Finally, the policy interpretation does not make use of any of the
common senses of "search" and instead says that any action that violates the
policy underlying the fourth amendment is a search. 14
An important difference between the first two and the last two
interpretations listed above is that the first two continue to use "search" in
a sense that is consistent with the semantic expectations of native speakers,
while the latter two depart from such semantic common sense.15 Within the
first set, the difference between the search of and the search out interpretations is that they use different common senses of search.
Using the common sense approach, the pivotal 1967 Supreme Court
decision in Katz v. United States, 16 which extended the fourth amendment to
cover most kinds of electronic eavesdropping, can be explained as a
semantic decision-a decision to include "search out" as a possible meaning
of "search" for fourth amendment purposes.' 7 None of the opinions in
Katz, however, made this semantic choice explicit, nor has any judge or
commentator since explained Katz in terms of precise semantic analysis.
14. A number of commentators have proposed some kind of dichotomy of privacy
interests protected by the fourth amendment that corresponds roughly to my distinction
between the intrusion and search out interpretations. See Goldberger, supra note 10, at 341-44
(security in houses limits access to specifically important locations while security in papers
reflects protection of privacy of communications and record-keeping); Grano, supra note 10,
at 430 (property privacy v. informational privacy); Posner, The UncertainProtectionof Privacy by
the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 173-76 (seclusion v. secrecy); Weinreb, Generalitiesof
the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 52-54 (1974) (privacy of place v. privacy of
presence); Note, The Concept of Privacyand the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 154, 174
(1972) (private areas v. private affairs).
Some readers may find my distinction between the search of and policy interpretations
reminiscent of Bruce Ackerman's "Ordinary Observer" and "Scientific Policymaker." See B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CoNSTrruTIoN 10 (1977). One important difference is that
Ackerman's Ordinary Observer relies not only on his semantic competence, id. at 10, but also
upon his knowledge of societal norms derived from socialization, id. at 15.
15. I deliberately have placed quotation marks around "search" in describing the intrusion
and policy interpretations to indicate that the word as used in those interpretations has a sense
different from that expected by the native speaker.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 136-53 (discussing the majority opinion in Katz).

A SEARCH FOR COMMON SENSE
The post-Katz confusion in fourth amendment law that plagues us today
can be attributed to a failure to expand the meaning of "search" beyond
"search of" by using semantic common sense. I suggest that a common
sense approach allowing "search" to be interpreted either as search of or
search out can explain most of the Court's important cases on the meaning
of search while retaining the inherent meaningfulness of everyday language.
I am deliberately using the phrase "common sense" with a double
meaning. At one level I am using "sense" the way a linguist would: to refer
to the portion of a word's meaning that controls its ability to combine with
other words to produce a meaningful expression.18 For communication to
succeed, the hearer must understand the words in an expression as having
the same senses as the speaker understands them to have. 19 Thus, communication among the members of the Court and between the Court and the
nation may fail if "search" does not have this shared linguistic understanding. But, of course, "common sense" itself has another sense. More
commonly the phrase suggests a kind of practical wisdom shared by people
generally that enables them to manage and solve life's problems. This kind
of common sense is often opposed to intellectual learning, usually with the
observation that common sense is sufficient, or even superior, for navigating through the world in a sound and stable way.
At one level the current confusion-and tangled history-of fourth
amendment law can be explained, at least in part, as a struggle to find a
common linguistic sense for "search" that describes the wide variety of
activities already regulated by the amendment and that can enable meaningful discussion about whether as-yet-uncategorized forms of government
action should be brought within the amendment's scope. But at another
level this article suggests that it may be possible to understand both the
amendment and its history of interpretation by the Court in a "common
sense" way-that is, in a way that relies more on knowledge and experience
shared by citizens generally than on specialized legal learning. The common sense knowledge we can employ is our native semantic competence in
the use of the word "search" in ordinary English discourse.
Part II of this article briefly reviews some basic principles of semantic
analysis and then applies these principles to construct a semantic structure
of search which distinguishes its three different common sense meanings:
search of, search for, and search out.20 In Part III the results of this
semantic analysis are applied to the text of the fourth amendment to reach
the conclusion that the text is ambiguous as to whether "searches" in the
first clause means search of, search out, or both.2 1 Part IV turns to the
historical events which gave rise to the enactment of the fourth amendment
18. See infra text accompanying note 30.
19. For example, consider the following request as an effort at communication: "Please
bring me the file." The hearer may bring a metal tool with an abrasive edge when the speaker
wanted a manila folder containing legal papers. The communication would then have been
unsuccessful because "file" has two different senses; the speaker and hearer did not
understand the expression with a common sense in mind.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 28-48.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 49-59.
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to help resolve this ambiguity and suggests that the pre-Revolutionary
both search
struggles to protect security of both houses and papers indicate
22
of and search out as possible interpretations of the text.
In Part V, the article begins the application of semantic analysis to the
Supreme Court's major fourth amendment decisions by focusing on the
formative period from 1928 to 1967 when the Court was occupied with the
question whether 'just listening" could be a search. The culmination of this
period in the landmark case of Katz v. United States23 is explained in light of
the common sense approach as the semantic expansion of search to include
24
search out as well as search of in the meaning of the constitutional text.
Part VI explains how this radical expansion was limited and confused by the
Court's subsequent requirement that the person claiming fourth amendment protection have a "legitimate" expectation of privacy. 25 Finally, Part
VII analyzes the Court's critical decisions of the last four years to show how
the vagueness of the legitimacy requirement has led the Court to mingle a
variety of conflicting meanings of search in an effort to restore common
sense to fourth amendment law. 26 The conclusion, Part VIII, proposes that
the approach implicitly created by Katz of including both, search of and
search out as meanings of search provides the best basis fo- developing a
of what activities are searches for
meaningful and flexible understanding
27
fourth amendment purposes.
II.

THE SEMANTICS OF SEARCHING

Semantics is the discipline within linguistics devoted to the study of the
meanings of words and the combination of words. 28 A semanticist constructs a theory of what a word means by examining how a native speaker
of the relevant language uses that word in combination with other words.
Speakers will agree whether an expression is semantically "correct" even if
they cannot articulate or agree on definitions of the words in the expression. By semantically correct I mean that the speaker can identify an
expression as well formed in a given context and as a semantically
appropriate description of a particular state of affairs. These abilities, which
the semanticist possesses for his or her own native language, provide the
central analytical tools for semantics. Thus, at many points in this article I
will invite the reader, as a fellow speaker of English, to test my semantic
analysis by posing expressions that the semantic analysis predicts native
speakers will identify as "wrong." The convention I will use to signal such
test expressions is a (?) preceding the expression. 2 9 For example, I would
See infra text accompanying notes 60-98.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See infra text accompanying notes 99-167.
See infra text accompanying notes 168-256.
See infra text accompanying notes 257-389.
See infra text accompanying notes 390-402.
1 (1977); J. HURFORD &
See G. DiLLoN, INrRoDucTnoN TO Co,,m'oRARY LNGUusC SE.rcs
B,HFAsLE', SEMANT-Ics: A COURSEBOOK 1 (1983).
29. For some semanticists "?" marks expressions viewed as merely questionable by
competent speakers while "*"marks those immediately perceived as unacceptable. I am using
"?"to cover both types of speaker response.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

A SEARCH FOR COMMON SENSE

predict that if I were to say, (?)"the detective searched the smell of garlic,"
most readers would feel that sentence somehow does not make sense. Yet
I could rephrase that sentence using both "search" and "smell of garlic" so
it would make sense. I could say, "the detective searched for the smell of
garlic," or "the detective searched out the smell of garlic."
Semantic theory seeks to predict speaker behavior in response to a
given expression in part by hypothesizing a conceptual structure for the
words in the expression. This conceptual structure is called a sense of the
word. The sense is a description (often partial) of the place the word
occupies in a system of relationships with other words in the same
language.3 0 In my semantic analysis I will use a notation of brackets ([ ]) and
angles (< >). Thus, the terms that appear in brackets will represent
conceptual characteristics of "search," while the terms in angles indicate
conceptual characteristics that must be present in another word, such as the
direct object of search, if both words are to combine into a meaningful
expression. I will follow the practice of many common semantic theories
and call both types of characteristics "semantic features." 31
A convenient way to begin semantic analysis is with the semantic
intuitions expressed in dictionaries. Both Webster's Dictionaryand the Oxford
English Dictionary identify three major distinct senses for "search" when
used as a verb: 32 (1) "to look into or over carefully or thoroughly in an effort
'3 4
to find or discover; '33 (2) "to look or inquire diligently and carefully;
(3)"to uncover, find, or come to know by diligent persevering inquiry or
scrutiny."3 5

The first sense of search can be identified in the verb form by the
absence of any preposition: "search X." The dictionary examples include:
search the countryside, search the apartment, search the suspect, and
search the records.3 6 I call this first sense "search of" because it can be
paraphrased "to conduct a search of X." Although very different physical
activities are described by the four examples, semantic analysis indicates
that all four share the feature: [movement through X1. The first example
given in the Oxford English Dictionary definition of "search of" is "to go
about" a country or place in order to find something,3 7 a usage that seems
most closely related to the etymological roots of "search" in Middle French
("cerchier"-to travel through, traverse, survey, search") and Late Latin
30. J. HuRFoRD & B. H.ASLEy, supra note 28, at 28.
31. Some theories term the bracketed features "markers" or "components" and the angled
features "selectional restrictions." See, e.g., G. DILLON, supra note 28, at 124, 128; J. KAxrz,
SEMANTIC THEORY 39, 43 (1972).
32. Search in the noun form is understood in terms of the verb, i.e., the act of searching.
WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2048 (1976).
33. WEBsTIER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICnIoNARY 2048 (1976). The Oxford English
Dictionary definition is "to explore, examine thoroughly." IX OXFORD ENGusH DianoARY 333 (2d
printing 1961).
34. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEv IMTRNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2048 (1976). The Oxford English
Dictionary adds "seek" and "to try to find" to the definition. See IX OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY
334 (2d printing 1961).
35. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DiCTioNARY 2048 (1976).
36. See IX OXFORD ENGLISH DIcnoNARY 333-34 (2d printing 1961).
37. See IX OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 333 (2d printing 1961).
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("circare"-to travel through, traverse").3 8 Although this sense of movement seems most obvious in the first dictionary example of searching a
countryside, it is also present in other dictionary examples of searching an
apartment, a suspect, or records.3 9 To search a person is to move one's
hands through the person's clothes and across his body. To search records
is to "go through" a collection of documents or pages.
A second feature of search of describes "X": <X is affected object>. A
third related semantic feature is: <X has surface or interior>. 40 A fourth
feature indicates that the movement must be taken with a certain purpose:
[purpose to find Y]. This feature predicts that in every "search of"
expression there is an assumed or hidden prepositional phrase using "for."
A speaker must be able to express what he is searching for, even if at a high
41
level of generality (for example, searching the apartment for evidence).
This semantic analysis correctly predicts that one cannot insert "smell
of garlic" into "search X" because "smell" has neither a surface nor an
interior. Therefore, "search the smell of garlic" does not make sense.
The second sense of "search" is marked in the verb form by the
preposition "for," as in the example "search for the smell of garlic." Unlike
"search of" this second sense does not contain an affected object feature
(<x is... >) because the verb describes merely the activity of the subject
and not the impact of that activity on some object. Accordingly, the
semantic features relating to "X" disappear. One remaining semantic
feature is shared by both senses: [purpose to find Y]. Unlike the features
pertaining to "X," no restrictive feature blocks the insertion of "smell of
garlic" for "Y"; hence, the analysis correctly predicts that a meaningful
expression can be constructed using "search for" with "smell of garlic."
The third sense is identified by the preposition "out": to search out the
smell of garlic. This third sense shares with "search of" both [purpose to
find Y] 42 and <X is affected object>. In place of the [movement] feature,
38. See WEsnER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcnoNARY 2048 (1976).
39. The Oxford English Dictionary contains the following examples:
to look through, examine internally (a building, an apartment, a receptacle of any
kind) in quest of some object concealed or lost; to examine (a person) by handling,
removal of garments, and the like, to ascertain whether any article (usually,
something stolen or contraband) is concealed in his clothing; to peruse, look through,
examine (writings, records) in order to discover whether certain things are contained
there
IX OXFORD ENGLISH DICnONARY 333-34 (2d printing 1961).
40. The conceptual structure of "search of' will force us to imagine even an apparently
intangible direct object as an area with a surface or interior as illustrated by the following
expression: "The police searched Smith's conversation." I do not mark this expression with a
"?" because some speakers may "make sense" of this expression by assuming that "conversation" refers to something other than vibrations which fade into thin air, such as: "The police
searched the transcript of Smith's conversation for a reference to the murder victim."
41. This feature distinguishes search from a similar term, look through. As a result, only
the first of the following two sets of expressions concludes with a meaningful statement:

I looked through your diary. What were you looking for? Oh, nothing-I was just

looking.
I searched through your diary. What were you searching for? (?) Oh,nothing-I was
just searching.
42. Note that in "search out" different variables are used in [find X] and [purpose to find

A SEARCH FOR COMMON SENSE
however, is a different description of the effect on X: [find X]. "X" no
longer need have a surface or interior; instead, the semantic analysis
indicates: <X is hard to find>. "Search out" affects "X" not by contact or
intrusion but, more subtiely, by destroying its hidden or elusive character.
The presence of the [find X] feature in "search out" but not "search for"
explains why only the first of the following sentences makes sense:
James Bond searched for the Russian code without finding it.
(?) James Bond searched out the Russian code without finding it.
A final common sense experiment using two different prepositional
phrases identifies yet another way in which the three senses are distinct
from each other. "Search for" can combine with the phrase "for -time,"
but not with "in -time":
I searched for his motive for two months.
(?) I searched for his motive in two months.
Semantic analysis explains this phenomenon by categorizing "search for" as
an, activity verb, a verb that describes action over time without entailing the
achievement of a goal.43 The phrase "in -_time"can combine only with an
achievement verb, like search out, that entails achievement of a goal within
the time period described by the phrase. In contrast, "search out" cannot
combine with "for __time" because it does not entail durational activity:
I searched out his motive in two months.
(?) I searched out his motive for two months.
"Search of" can combine with both phrases because it entails both a
durational activity and the achievement of a goal within a definite period:
I searched the house for ten minutes.
(?) I searched the house in ten minutes.
The following partial semantic description of the three senses of
"search" summarizes the preceding analysis:
(1)

SEARCH X ("search of")
[purpose to find Y]
[activity]
<X is affected object>

(2)

SEARCH FOR Y
[purpose to find Y]
[activity]

(3)

SEARCH OUT X
[purpose to find Y]
<X is affected object>

[movement through X]
[achievement]
<X has surface or interior>

[find X]
[achievement]
<X is hard to find>

Y] to indicate that one can search out something different from what one is searching for, e.g.:
"The police were only searching the housefor marijuana [Y] but also searched out a cache of
automatic weapons [X]."

43. See G.

DILLON,

supra note 28, at 122-23 (glossary: achievement verbs).
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Before moving on to make use of this semantic analysis, it will be
helpful to include in our kit of linguistic tools four terms that parse out
different aspects of what is loosely called "meaning." Three of these terms
describe different ways in which an expression can lack meaning: ambiguity, vagueness, and incoherence. An expression is ambiguous if it uses a
44
word with one or more senses without identifying which sense is meant.
A word is vague if it fails to contribute a sufficiently detailed sense to make
an expression meaningful. 45 An incoherent expression is caused by the
combination of words with incompatible senses. 46 The words may be
meaningful in isolation, but the expression does not make sense. The
expressions marked with a "(?)" above are incoherent.
The final term is "connotation," which indicates a concept that is not
part of the sense of a word, but frequently is associated with its use. Words
often acquire new senses when connotations become sufficiently strong to
create a distinct, new meaning. "Search of" carries a connotation of forcible
entry or invasion, which has contributed to a specialized sense in fourth
amendment vocabulary, 47 as has the connotation that the
object of search48
ing out is not only hard to find but deliberately secret.

III.

THE AMBIGuITY OF THE TEXT

The word "search" appears in two different places in the text of the
fourth amendment. It first appears in the first clause's familiar "unreasonable searches and seizures" phrase, which has been the focus of so much
attention and controversy: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... ,,49 It also appears in the second clause,
usually called the warrant clause: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." 50
In the warrant clause, "search" appears in the verbal form without the
preposition "out" or "for." This syntactic structure clearly indicates that
''search of' is the sense of search in "place to be searched." The kind of
44. The example used previously about a file, see supra note 19, shows ambiguity at work.
Often the semantic features of other words in an expression remove potential ambiguity, as in
the following examples using "file":
Please smooth the plank with the file. Please read the file carefully.
45. A classic example of a vague word is "thing." The following expression does not convey
much information standing alone: "I dislike that thing." As in the case of ambiguity, the
semantic features of other words in an expression can help cure vagueness: "I dislike the odor
of that red thing." In this expression we at least know that "thing" is an object which can
project both color and odor.
46. "Incoherent" is not, strictly speaking, a semantic term of art, but I have adopted it
instead of graceless phrases like "selectional restriction violation" or "anomalous," which more
commonly are used in linguistics. See G. DILLON, supra note 28, at 2, 123, 128; J. KATz, supra
note 31, at 49. It is the absence or conflict of angled (< >) semantic features that make an
expression incoherent.
47. See izfra text accompanying notes 71-74.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 83-87.
49. U.S. Coxsr. amend. IV (emphasis added).
50. Id. (emphasis added).
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warrant described by the text typically would authorize the government to
conduct a search of a particular placefor particular persons or things, which
then would be seized. In light of the kind of warrants that concerned the
framers, 5 1 it is not surprising that the warrant clause addressed warrants
authorizing searches of places for persons or things.
The first clause contains fewer contextual clues. "Search" appears in a
nominal form without even a suggested object within the phrase in which
it is used. The modifier "unreasonable" contains no semantic features that
would select out one from the three possible senses. Syntactically, the first
and the second clauses are independent; they could have been written as
separate sentences. Still, the limitation of "search" in the second clause to
"search of"might be more suggestive of the meaning of "search" in the first
clause if not for the little history we do know about the drafting of the
amendment. The Congressional sponsor of the fourth amendment, James
Madison, introduced the amendment in the form of this single clause:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their
houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing
the places to be searched, or the persons or
52
things to be seized.
Madison's version would have equated the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures solely with a prohibition of warrants
issued without probable cause or particular description, thereby making
what is now the first clause little more than a rhetorical preamble to the
substantive warrant clause.5 3 When Madison's version was introduced on
the floor of the House of Representatives, Representative Benson moved to
replace the phrase "by warrants issuing" with the phrase "and no warrant
shall issue. 5 4 The House Journal records as Benson's only explanation that
Madison's "declaratory provision was good as far as it went, but he thought
it was not sufficient." 55 Benson's motion lost on the floor, but Benson had
the last word. He chaired a committee of three that was charged with
preparing for the House a final draft of the Bill of Rights. The draft
reported out by the committee contained Benson's previously unsuccessful
proposal.5 6 That revised version of two independent clauses passed the
House apparently without comment 57 and eventually became the fourth
amendment.
Benson's admittedly brief recorded comment is consistent with the
obvious effect of his revision. By splitting Madison's sentence into two
51. See infra text accompanying notes 60-74.
52. 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 434-35 (J. Gales ed. 1834), quoted in N. LAsoN, THE HisrORy AND
DEVELOPMINEN"
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100

n.77 (1937).

53. Cf. N. LAssoN, supra note 52, at 100 n.77 ("The observation may be made that the
language of [Madison's] proposal did not purport to create the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures but merely stated it as a right which already existed.").
54. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 52, at 754.

55. See id.; N. LAsso, supra note 52, at 101.
56. See N. LAssoN, supra note 52, at 101.
57. See id.
at 101-02.
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independent clauses, he created two constitutional mandates where only
one had existed before. Not only would the fourth amendment ban certain
types of warrants, but it also would generally prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures that violated the right of the people to be secure. Benson took
Madison's insufficient "declaratory" statement about a right to be secure
and made it "go far enough" by transforming it into a statement of positive
constitutional law. His revision thus would seem to exemplify a famous view
of the role of constitutional law: "a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." 58 If abuse of
warrants was the mischief that gave birth to the fourth amendment,
Representative Benson succeeded in transforming that impetus into a
principle capable of wider application.
If we therefore assume that the text as revised frees the first clause
from the more narrow scope of the warrant clause, we must be cautious
about limiting "searches" in the first clause to the meaning of "to be
searched" in the warrant clause. 59 Of course the list of "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" in the clause still seems to parallel the respective objects
of search and seize in the warrant clause. But the first clause does not
allocate the items in its list between "search" and "seize" as does the warrant
clause. Although the framers probably were not concerned about protecting the people against the government searching for or searching out their
houses, if the first clause is read in isolation, "unreasonable searches" could
include searching for or searching out persons, papers, and effects.
The first clause does contain, however, a strong indication that
"unreasonable searches" does not include merely searches for. Even after
Benson's revision, the fourth amendment is not a direct prohibition of
unreasonable searches. Rather, the first clause describes a "right of the
people" that shall not be violated. This right has two limiting modifiers: (1)
it is a right "to be secure in... persons, houses, papers, and effects," and
(2) it is a right "against unreasonable searches and seizures." "Search" thus
appears literally as a partial description of a kind of right, not as a
prohibited practice per se. Therefore, one of the features of an unreasonable search is that it must be capable of affecting the people's right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.
Both search of and search out have among their semantic features an
<affected object>, although each affects its object differently. Search for,
on the other hand, is an intransitive verb that neither achieves a goal nor
affects an object. Search for merely describes the activity of the subject, the
searcher. It cannot function semantically to affect an object such as a house,
person, paper, or effect. As usual, our semantic common sense corresponds
with our pragmatic common sense. Mere curiosity or inquiry by a governmental official does not seem to pose a substantial threat to our security in
58. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910), qzwted with approval in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59. At least one modern scholar maintains that the phrase "unreasonable searches" in the
first clause should be understood as referring explicitly and solely to searches conducted

pursuant to warrants not complying with the procedural requirements of the warrant clause.
See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES

IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

41-44 (1969).
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ourselves, our homes, papers, and effects, nor does it seem reasonable to
think that the framers intended the fourth amendment to regulate every
governmental effort to find a person, place, paper, or effect.
Having come this far, we seem to have exhausted the potential of the
text, standing alone, to indicate either search of or search out, or both, as
the appropriate sense for "unreasonable searches." The next step is to turn
to the larger historical context of the Bill of Rights for some dues to resolve
this ambiguity.
IV.

LOOKING TO HISTORY TO HELP RESOLVE AMBIGUITY

Most scholars agree that the fourth amendment grew directly out of
specific historical events preceding the American Revolution: the colonial
struggle against writs of assistance and the contemporaneous British
protests against general warrants.6 0 Writs of assistance were judicial orders
empowering customs officers of the Crown to summon peace officers to
protect and assist them while they entered and searched buildings for
smuggled goods.6 1 The general warrant was used primarily to enforce
seditious libel laws by authorizing royal officers to search out and seize
publications critical of the Crown.6 2 Both the writs of assistance and general
warrants failed to describe
particularly the places to be searched and the
63
items to be seized.
A.

To Be Secure in One's House: The Writs of Assistance

In 1761 the Superior Court of Massachusetts heard arguments on the
petition of Thomas Lechmere, Surveyor General of Customs, for the
granting of writs of assistance. 64 The case created great controversy and,
according to no less an authority than John Adams, sowed the seeds of the
Revolution. 65 James Otis, opposing the writs, argued in a famous passage:
Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the
freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while he
60. See, e.g., J. LANDYNSKI,
61. See id. at 31-32.
62. See id. at 20-30.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT

19-20 (1966).

63. See id. at 31.

64. The case sometimes is referred to as Paxton's Case because the surveyor of the Port of
Boston, Charles Paxton, was the initial petitioner. Lechmere later intervened on behalf of the
Crown. See 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 113 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel ed. 1965).
65. In a letter to William Tudor, Adams wrote: "Then and there was the first scene of the
first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born. In fifteen years, i.e., in 1776, he grew up to manhood, declared
himself free." Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (March 29, 1817), quoted in id. at 107.
On the morning of July 3, 1776, John Adams wrote to his wife:
When I look back to the year 1761 and recollect the argument concerning writs of
assistance, in the superior court, which I have hitherto considered as the commencement of the controversy between Great Britain and America, and recollect the series
of political events, the chain of causes and events, I am surprised by the suddenness
of the revolution.
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (July 3, 1776), quoted in N. LAssoN, supra note 52,
at 61.
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is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if
it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege.
Custom house officers may enter our houses when they pleasewe are commanded to permit their entry-their menial servants
may enter-break locks, bars and every thing in their way-and
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man,
no court
66
can inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.
Otis's language was echoed ten years later in the Boston "Declaration
of the Rights of Colonists," which included among its lists of grievances
against the Crown that "our Houses and even our Bed-Chambers are
exposed to be ransacked ...by Wretches, whom no prudent Man would
as Menial Servants. '67

venture to employ even
Powerful memories of the writs of assistance influenced events when
opponents of the proposed constitution expressed fears of a strong federal
government unrestrained by a Bill of Rights. At the Virginia convention,
Patrick Henry rose to oppose a resolution to ratify the proposed constitution, saying:
The officers of Congress may come upon you now, fortified with
all the terrors of paramount federal authority ....

They may,

unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or
some similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and
search, ransack and measure, every thing you eat, drink, and
wear. 68
As a result of the arguments of Henry and others, the influential Virginia
convention agreed to ratify only on condition that a proposed Bill of Rights
be forwarded to the first Congress for addition to the Constitution by
amendment.6 9 One of the proposed provisions in the Virginia bill of
rights
70
was a longer version of Madison's draft of the fourth amendment.

66. 2 LEGAL PAPERSOF John ADAMS, supra note 64, at 142. We have no transcript of the
argument and must rely on Adams' account, based on notes he took in the courtroom.
67. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 60, at 38 n.90.
68. 3

DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTTUTION

448-49 U. Elliot 2d ed. 1881). Similar statements were made by Henry at other times during
the Virginia convention. See id. at 588.
69. New York and North Carolina followed Virginia's lead and recommended similar bills
of rights when they ratified. 13 JOURNAL OF CONGRESS 173-84 (1801); see also Stengel, The
Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Part Two, 4 U. RcH. L.
REv. 60, 70 n.37 (1969) (discussing conditional ratification of the Constitution).
70. The Virginia proposal stated:
That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his papers, and property; all warrants, therefore, to search
suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers, or property, without information
on oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of taking an oath) of legal
and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warants to search
suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person without specially naming or
describing the place or person, are dangerous, and ought not to be granted.
3 DEBATES, supra note 68, at 658. It is interesting to note that the Virginia proposal, like
Benson's, and unlike Madison's, version of the amendment, stated the right to be secure in a
separate independent clause from the prohibition on general warrants. Madison, of course,
was a representative from Virginia in the first Congress.
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Obviously, the hated writs of assistance were examples of warrants
prohibited by the warrant clause: warrants issued without probable cause
and particular description that authorized entry of private homes to search
for and seize persons, papers, and effects. This historical background also
provides insight into the relationship between the right to be secure and the
semantic features of search of. Henry's speech at the Virginia convention of
course involved the feature [movement through an area] ("go into your
cellars and rooms"), but added the connotation of forceful intrusion:
"fortified with the terrors of paramount federal authority ... [they will]
'71
search [and] ransack."
At another point during the Virginia convention Henry again paired
"search" with "ransack": "Every thing the most sacred may be searched
and
ransacked by the strong hand of power. '72 In this context of protecting
domestic life, "sacred" did not mean holy, but rather "[s]ecured by religious
sentiment, reverence, sense of justice, or the like, against violation, infringement, or encroachment. '73 The forced entry and subsequent ransacking affected one's home particularly because a house that could be so
74
searched had lost to a degree its sacred character.
These connotations of forcible intrusion and violation of a sacred place
have had a powerful influence on the Court's interpretation of search, as
will be seen below. At this point, though, it is important to remember that
the background context of the controversy over writs of assistance is
helpful, but not decisive, in interpreting the ambiguous first clause of the
fourth amendment. Benson's revision to Madison's version of the amendment had the effect of making such abuses of the warrant procedure an
important example, rather than the definition, of unreasonable searches. In
addition, the fourth amendment may well have at least one other parentthe British controversy over general warrants, the history of which suggests
a "right to be secure" that is distinct from protection against forcible
invasion of sacred places.
B.

To Be Secure in One's Papers: General Warrants

The language of the first clause of the fourth amendment suggests
that there may be a difference between the right to be secure in papers and
the right to be secure in effects, since both are listed separately. 75 "Effects"
71. Id. at 448. See supra text accompanying note 68.
72. 3 DEBATES, supra note 68, at 588.
73. IX OXFORD ENGLiSH DICnONARY 16 (2d printing 1961).

74. The point is clearly made in a passage from Blackstone no doubt familiar to the
framers:
Burglary... has always been looked upon as a very heinous offense; not only because
of the abundant terror that it naturally carries with it, but also as it is a forcible
invasion and disturbance of that right of habitation which every individual might
acquire even in a state of nature.... And the law of England has so particular and
tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it styles it his castle, and will
never suffer it to be violated with impunity; agreeing herein with the sentiments of
ancient Rome, as expressed in the words of Tully: ["For what is more sacred, more
inviolate than the house of every citizen."]
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 223.
75. See supra text accompanying note 49. The warrant clause merges the two together by
referring to "things to be seized." See infra text accompanying note 76.
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appears to refer to personal property, in contrast to real property. 76 If so,
"papers" might seem redundant, since one's papers would be included in
one's effects. If we pause, however, to consider the famous general warrants
litigation that occurred in England at about the same time as the writs of
assistance controversy began in the colonies, the historical context may
reveal why security in papers was considered different than security in
effects generally.
In 1762 John Wilkes, an obstreperous member of the British House of
Commons, began publishing a series of anonymous pamphlets criticizing
government policies. 77 The following year one of these pamphlets particularly offended the Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, who issued a general
warrant to four of his messengers " 'to make strict and diligent search for
the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable
paper... and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize,
together with their papers.' "78 In three days these messengers arrested
forty-nine persons as they searched for the pamphlet's publisher. Finally
discovering that Wilkes was the author, they seized him and all his private
papers. Wilkes spent several days in the Tower of London before being
released under his privilege as a member of Parliament. 79
A barrage of litigation ensued as Wilkes and a number of the printers
subjected to the search filed trespass and false imprisonment actions.80 The
plaintiffs won substantial damages, as the courts held that the general
warrants were illegal and refused to overturn the awards as excessive.8 1
Another pamphleteer, John Entick, who earlier had been subjected to a
Lord Halifax general warrant, was emboldened by Wilkes's success and
filed what became the most famous case of the lot, Entick v. Carrington.82
Although the restrictive forms of pleading forced Entick to file an
action in trespass, the heart of his complaint was the allegation that "the
secret affairs, & c. of the plaintiff became wrongfully discovered and made
public." 83 In opening argument his counsel compared the execution of the
general warrant to the techniques of the Spanish Inquisition:
ransacking a man's secret drawers and boxes to come at evidence
against him, is like racking his body to come at his secret thoughts.
76. The Supreme Court takes this view: "The Framers would have understood 'effects' to

be limited to personal, rather than real, property." Oliver v. United States. 466 U.S. 170, 177
n.7 (1984). Madison's draft used "other property" where "effects" now appears. See A,,Ats oF
CoNG., supra note 52, at 434-35; see also supra text accompanying note 52.
77. See N. L.kssoN, supra note 52, at 43.
78. Id.. Ironically, one of the pamphlet's criticisms was that the excise collectors had

unbridled power to search private homes. See id. at 43 n.1 0 8.
79. See id. at 43-44.

80. See id. at 44-46.
81. See Leach v. Money, 19 Howell's State Trials 1002, 1023, 96 Eng. Rep. 320,323 (1765);
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wilson's King's Bench 205, 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (1763); Wilkes v.
Woods, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153, 1166, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498 (1763). Wilkes eventually
obtained a verdict against Lord Halifax himself for 4,000 pounds. See Wilkes v. Halifax, 19
Howell's State Trials 1406, 1407, 95 Eng. Rep. 797, 797 (1769). The Crown bore all the
expenses in the cases, which were reported to exceed 100,000 pounds. See N. LAsso-, supra
note 52, at 45.
82. 19 Howell's State Trials 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
83. Id. at 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. at 807.
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Has a Secretary of State right to see all a man's private letters
of correspondence, family concerns, trade and business? This
if it were lawful, no man could
would be monstrous indeed; and
84
endure to live in this country.
Entick's arguments struck a responsive chord in the judge, Lord
Camden. In his judgment for Entick, Lord Camden made it clear that the
wrongful uncovering of the plaintiff's personal secrets was one of the most
substantial harms caused by the use of the general warrant:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will
hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of
England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are
removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be
and demand more considerable
an aggravation of the trespass
85
damages in that respect.
We can sense Lord Camden struggling within the semantic limitations
of his legal vocabulary. Entry to Entick's house was a trespass as was seizure
of his personal property. 86 The agents of the Crown, however, not only
seized Entick's papers, they read them. Even though the eye cannot commit
a trespass, it was the peculiar character of papers that they could not "bear
an inspection." Although Lord Camden could give legal significance to this
loss of secrecy only by increasing the damages awarded, his common sense
told him that the "secret nature" of the papers was the heart of the case.
The claim vindicated was not merely that the government intruded into
Entick's house and deprived him of his property; by reading his personal
papers the government searched out his secrets and87thus caused the
greatest harm to Entick's fundamental right of security.
If, as is widely assumed, the framers had the Wilkes affair and the
Entick decision in mind when they drafted and adopted the fourth
amendment, 88 the right to be secure in papers should include the right to
...

84. Id. at 1035, 95 Eng. Rep. at 812.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. ("every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass").
87. The year after Lord Camden rendered his judgment in Entick, Parliament demonstrated a similar understanding that papers deserved special protection distinct from the
general right to preserve private property from intrusion and seizure. In 1766 the House of
Commons passed two separate resolutions in response to the Wilkes affair. One condemned
the use of general warrants in libel cases; the other declared the seizure of papers in a libel case
to be illegal. Editor's note following Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1074-75. Parliament
evidently felt the need for a separate provision to protect the secrecy of personal papers,
however obtained by the government.
88. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886).
As every American statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period as a
nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom, [Entick,]
and considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be

confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. Wilkes himself was a popular figure among colonists because of his outspoken criticisms of
the Crown, and he maintained a considerable correspondence with such leading Americans as
James Otis, Samuel Adams, John Adams, Josiah Quincy, and John Hancock. See N. LASSON,
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protect the secret contents of private papers as well as the right to prevent
intrusive rummaging and seizures. In Boyd v. United States,8 9 the only major
Supreme Court decision of the 19th century interpreting "search" in the
fourth amendment, the Entick decision provided the basis for such an
intepretation by the Court.
In 1874 Congress enacted a customs revenue act 90 that contained a
provision carefully crafted in an attempt to avoid the warrant requirements
of the fourth amendment. The provision authorized the U.S. Attorney to
issue to a civil defendant in a forfeiture action a subpoena to produce "any
business book, invoice, or paper," setting forth by allegation the facts
expected to be proved by the materials. If the defendant failed to produce
the materials, the allegations would be taken as true. The act carefully
specified that the defendant who complied by presenting the materials to
the U.S. Attorney for examination would still retain custody of them.9 ' In
spite of this careful drafting, the Court held in Boyd that the subpoena
92
procedure violated the fourth amendment.
Because the defendant retained possession of his papers at all times,
he could not claim that the government had seized them. And, as the Court
recognized, the government's action defied characterization as a search of:
"It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure,
such asforcible entry into a man's house and searchingamongst his papers, are
wanting ....,,93 What was "wanting" was the semantic feature [movement
through an area], which is present in both "forcible entry" and "searching
amongst." The Court noted an important semantic distinction by using the
preposition "amongst." Had the procedure resulted in the production of
several boxes of records that the customs officers then went through, one
could say that the officers searched the defendant's papers, by imagining
papers as a total area. In fact, though, the procedure caused the defendant
to produce only the single invoice the government wanted to see. 94
Although the Boyd opinion did not use search out to express the
conclusion that the procedure was a search, the semantic features identified
and relied upon by the Court are those belonging to search out:
It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a
man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or
to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment ...because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole
supra note 52, at 46 n.114.
89, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).

90. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, 18 Stat. 186.
91. Id. § 5, 18 Stat. at 187.
92. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
93. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).

94. See id. at 619-21. The presence of [movement through an area] had enabled the Court
to avoid this problem of interpretation in an earlier case involving examination of personal
mail while in transit through the postal service. See Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).

Because the government already had lawful custody of the letters, the Court could not say that
a seizure occurred. See id. at 733. The opening of the envelopes, however, provided sufficient

movement to enable a literal application of search of. The government "searched the
envelopes." Nonetheless, the Court's opinion seemed to recognize that the true object of the
search was not the envelopes but "the secrecy of letters." Id.

A SEARCH FOR COMMON SENSE
object and purpose of search and seizure. 95
The object effected by the procedure directed against the papers was
"obtaining the information therein contained. '96 The Court then turned to
Entick as authority for the proposition that the right to be secure in papers
extended beyond the prevention of physical acts of searching:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense [in Entick]; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property.... [Ilt is the invasion of this
sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord
Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes
and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible
and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to
97
forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment.
Like Entick, Boyd successfully claimed that his "secret affairs ... became
wrongfully discovered and made public."98
The unarticulated semantic implication of Boyd was that "the right to
be secure in papers" could be protected to the full extent contemplated by
the framers only if search out as well as search of was a possible sense of
"unreasonable searches." Boyd stood as evidence that a search out interpretation was sufficiently plausible to potentially command a majority on the
Supreme Court. Thus, as the nation entered the 20th century, a latent
ambiguity lurked in the fourth amendment, waiting for the problem of the
'Just listening" cases, which tortured and ultimately altered the shape of
fourth amendment law.
V.

FOUR INTERPRETATIONS OF "SEARCH":

THE JUST LISTENING CASES

For almost forty years, from 1928-1967, the Supreme Court struggled
with cases involving various kinds of technologically aided listeningwiretapping, 99 hidden microphones,1 00 and ultra-sensitive listening
devices.1i0 In each case the government took the position that no search
had occurred because its agents were 'just listening." 0 2 These cases
brought to the surface the latent ambiguity of "search" in the first clause of
the fourth amendment. Any conversion of a sentence using "listen" into
one using "search of" was incoherent because listen does not contain the
key semantic feature, [movement through an area], required for search of:
95. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.

96. Id. at 624.
97. Id. at 630.
98. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029-30, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807 (1765).
99. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 US. 438, 444-45 (1928).
100. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747, 749 (1952).
101. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1942).
102. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511; On Lee, 343 U.S. at 751; Goldman,
316 U.S. at 135; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-65.
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The police listened to my phone call.
103
(?) The police searched my phone call.
A second semantic feature blocks conversion of "listen" into "search
of." Listen does not take an affected object while search of must. Listening
has no effect on either the sound waves received or the0 4source of those
waves; listening only describes an activity of the listener.
In the first case of the forty year struggle, Olmstead v. United States,10 5
federal prohibition officers had tapped the telephone lines leading from
the homes of four defendants and from Olmstead's office without entering
the homes or office.' 0 6 The officers monitored calls for many months,
disclosing "a conspiracy of amazing magnitude to import, possess, and sell
liquor unlawfully."' 0 7 Chief Justice Taft, writing for a bare majority of five,
implicitly assumed that search can mean only search of, by relying on the
absence of [movement through X] and <X has surface or interior> to
conclude that no search took place:
The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects.... The
Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the
use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
houses or offices of the defendants .... [Previous cases have said

that the Fourth Amendment was] to be liberally construed to
effect the purpose of the framers of the, Constitution in the
interest of liberty. But that cannot justify enlargement of the
language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of
houses, persons, papers and effects, or so to apply
the words
08
search and seizure as to forbid hearing and sight.
One of the dissenters, Justice Butler, planted the seeds of the intrusion
interpretation:
The communications belong to the parties between whom they
pass. During their transmission the exclusive use of the wire
belongs to the persons served by it. Wire tapping involves
interference with the wire while being used. Tapping the wires and
103. See supra note 40 (discussion of searching a conversation).
104. Of course search out also has the feature <affected object>. The direct object of
search out is affected by being disclosed. Conversion of expressions built around listening to
searching out requires identification of something hidden that was disclosed by means of
listening. See infra note 149.
105. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
106. Id. at 444-45.
107. Id. at 455-56.
108. Id. at 464-65 (emphasis added). Taft's opinion often is treated as an example of the
intrusion interpretation. For example, James Boyd White suggests that even under Taft's
interpretation the wiretapping could have been viewed as a search because the tap was a
trespass under the common law. See White,Judicial Criticism,20 GA. L. REv. 835, 850-51 (1986).
A close reading of Taft's opinion, however, shows that he held consistently to the semantic
features of search of. Even when he included "physical invasion" of the house or curtilage in
the definition of search, he added that the invasion had to be "for the purpose of making a
seizure," Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466, thus recognizing the [purpose to find] component that
distinguishes a search from a mere trespass or other physical invasion.
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listening in by the officers literally constituted a search for
evidence. As the communications passed, they were heard and
taken down. 109
Justice Butler evoked an image of the telephone wire as a tube, belonging
to the defendants, through which tangible messages passed. The tap
intruded into the wire and seized the passing messages, thus "searching"
the defendants' telephone lines." 0
A few paragraphs after the above passage, Justice Butler apparently
invoked the policy interpretation: "This Court has always construed the
Constitution in the light of the principles upon which it was founded. The
direct operation or literal meaning of the words used do not measure the
purpose or scope of its provisions.""' Yet it was Justice Brandeis's famous
dissent that fully developed the policy interpretation only suggested by
Butler:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone- the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 12
Justice Brandeis's response to the semantic limitations of search of was to
remove "search," in any of its senses, from the first clause of the fourth
amendment. The text of the amendment protects against violation of the
limited right "to be secure... againstunreasonable searches and seizures."' 13
Under Justice Brandeis's policy interpretation the right to be secure (or in
his terms, "the right to be let alone" or the right to privacy' 1 4) would be
protected against any kind of governmental violation. Noticeably absent
from the Olmstead decision, and from the ensuing decisions of the next forty
109. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

110. Id. Note how this metaphoric use of search of not only requires imagining the
wiretapping as going into the wire, but also imposes on the wire the character of a container.

Significantly, Justice Butler still did not actually say that the government searched the telephone

wire. Rather, he fell back on search for, which contains none of the troubling semantic
restrictions. He seemed aware that his description of the wire as a tube through which tangible

messages passed was only a metaphor that could not support a literal use of search of.

111. Olrstead, 277 U.S. at 487-88 (Butler, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Holmes stated in his

separate dissent that while he was not prepared to say that the "penumbra" of the fourth
amendment covered wiretapping, he did "fully agree that courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them." Id. at

469 (Holmes, J., dissenting). He went on to argue that the evidence obtained by the
wiretapping should have been excluded under the Court's supervisory powers. See id. at
470-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
113. U.S. Coxsr. amend. IV (emphasis added).
114. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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years, was the search out interpretation.
The Court next had occasion to debate whether listening can be a
search in Goldman v. United States.,15 The defendants in Goldman challenged
evidence obtained by eavesdropping from an adjoining office using a
"detectaphone" placed against the partition wall." 6 The detectaphone was
used after federal agents had entered the defendants' office the previous
night to install a listening device, which failed to operate. 117 The Court
found that this prior intrusion did not distinguish the case from Olmstead
because the entry did not aid in the subsequent use of the detectaphone,
which itself involved no intrusion into the office." 8 The majority's emphasis on the trespass issue suggested some movement from Taft's search of
interpretation to the intrusion interpretation. In dissent, Justice Murphy
merged the intrusion and policy interpretations by contending that the
agents had conducted "a search of [defendant's] private quarters" because
the use of the detectaplione constituted "a direct invasion of the privacy of
the occupant."' "19
The defendant in On Lee v. United States120 hoped to distinguish both
Olmstead and Goldman because his incriminating statements had been
overheard by means of a physical entry into his place of business. One of On
Lee's old friends, Chin Poy, who had agreed to be an undercover agent,
sauntered into the defendant's laundry and engaged him in conversation. A
government agent outside listened to the conversation through a radio
transmitter worn by Chin Poy.' 2 1 The search of interpretation was notice122
ably absent from the majority opinion as well as the several dissents.
115. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
116. Id. at 131-32.
117. Id. at 131.
118. See id. at 135.
119. Id. at 141 (Murphy, J., dissenting). He conceded that the agents did not literally
conduct a search of the office because the [movement] needed for search of was absent: "if the
language of the Amendment were given only a literal construction, it might not fit the case
now presented for review. The petitioners were not physically searched. Their homes were not
entered. Their files were not ransacked.Their papers and effects were not disturbed." Id. at 138
(Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). He sought, however, to merge the intrusion and
policy interpretations by tacitly equating invasion of privacy with invasion of the office:
[W]e must give mind not merely to the exact words of the Amendment, but also to its
historic purpose, its high political character, and its modern social and legal
implications.... [The search of one's home or office no longer requires physical
entry, for science has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a
person's privacy than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which were
detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 138-39 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Stone and Justice Frankfurter concurred
saying they felt bound by Olmstead, but gladly would join in overruling Olmstead for the reasons
expressed in Ohnstead's dissenting opinions. See id. at 136 (Stone, C.J., & Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
120. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
121. Id. at 749-53.
122. None of the opinions ever used "search" as a verb, thus suppressing the important
semantic features such as [movement] that are revealed only in the verb form. An interesting
contrast is found in Judge Jerome Frank's dissent from the lower court decision in which he
argued at length that "listening to the sounds in a room is searching" because the "every-day
meaning of 'search' " is "the act of seeking." United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 313 (2d
Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), affd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). Of course Frank's argument
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Instead, all eyes were on the question of intrusion. The majority wrote that
the fourth amendment was inapplicable because there was no trespass:
Chin Poy entered by implied consent and the listening government agent
did not enter at all. 123 Justice Burton in dissent also relied on the intrusion
interpretation by asserting that the agent "entered" through the hidden
transmitter.124 Justice Douglas, on the other hand, wrote that the absence

of intrusion was irrelevant and adopted the policy interpretation
of the
26
Brandeis Olmstead dissent,125 as did Justice Frankfurter.
By 1961, when Silverman v. United States127 reached the Court, a
majority of the Justices clearly were ready to apply the fourth amendment
to at least some kinds of technologically aided listening. The facts in
Silverman were almost identical to those in Goldman.' 28 The only distinguishing fact was that the police listened to the defendants' conversations in
their row house by driving a "spike mike" into the partition wall from an
adjoining unit rather than by merely placing the microphone against the

wall.' 29 Fortuitously, the spike contacted a heating duct, "thus converting
[defendants'] entire heating system into a conductor of sound"' 30 and
making conversations throughout the house audible. A unanimous Court
held that a search had occurred.' 3 ' The opinion by Justice Stewart explicitly
adopted the intrusion interpretation, 32 distinguishing On Lee, Goldman,
and Olmstead on the ground that listening in those cases had not been
accomplished by "an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area."' 3 3 The Court refused to overrule Goldman, but instead said it
34
declined "to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch.'
Silverman shows how the intrusion interpretation could lead to incoherence. The Court's reasoning would seem to have made the fourth
assumed that search for (the "act of seeking") is a possible sense for search. For explanation
why search for is not a plausible sense in the fourth amendment context, see supra text
following note 59.
123. See On Lee, 343 U.S. at 751-52.
124. Justice Burton stressed that "Chin Poy . . . took with him the concealed radio
transmitter to which agent Lee's receiving set was tuned. For these purposes, that amounted
to Chin Poy surreptitiously bringing Lee with him." Id. at 766 (Burton, J., dissenting).
125. After quoting the Brandeis dissent at length, Justice Douglas stated that "the decisive
factor is the invasion of privacy." Id. at 765 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 761-62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
127. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
128. For a discussion of Goldman's facts, see supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
129. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506.
130. Id. at 507.
131. See id.at 511.
132. Stewart began by saying "the record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by
the petitioners." Id. at 509 (emphasis added). After discussing the facts of On Lee, Goldman, and
Olmstead, Stewart concluded, "This Court has never held that a federal officer may without
warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there secretly
observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard." Id.
at 511-12 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 512; see also id. at 510 (in both Goldman and On Lee "the eavesdropping had not
been accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area"); id. (the "absence of a physical invasion of the petitioner's premises
was also a vital factor in" the Olmstead decision).
134. Id. at 512.
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amendment applicable had the officers driven a nail, instead of a spike
mike, into the heating duct. But obviously an intrusion by a nail is not a
search, as shown by the incoherence created in the following attempt to
transform "nailing" into "searching":
The government intruded into my house by driving a nail into
my wall.
(?) The government searched my house by driving a nail into my
wall.' 3 5
In 1967 the Court decided Katz v. United States, 136 which generally is
regarded as one of the most important fourth amendment cases in
American history. 3 7 Mr. Katz had been convicted of making interstate bets
by telephone in violation of a federal statute. 138 The key evidence against
him was a recording of his end of several telephone calls made from a
public telephone booth. The agents recorded Katz's statements by attaching an electronic listening device to the outside of the booth. 13 9 The Court
because there "was no
of Appeals had found that no search took place 140
physical entrance into the area" occupied by Katz.
Understandably, in light of Silverman, the parties presented their
arguments to the Court in terms of the intrusion interpretation. The two
issues framed on certiorari were: (a) whether a public telephone booth is a
constitutionally protected area, and (b) whether physical penetration of a
constitutionally protected area is necessary for the fourth amendment to
apply. 4 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart declined "to adopt this
formulation of the issues," saying that the parties had framed the issues in
a "misleading way."' 42 Justice Stewart then proceeded to reject unambiguously the intrusion interpretation that he himself had adopted six years
earlier in Silverman: "the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the

135. The suggestion in Silverman that the intrusion into the heating duct "usurp[ed] part of

the [defendants'] house" only added an unpersuasive metaphor that the agents "seized" the
house. See id. at 511. In any event, the Court made it clear that the "usurpation" of the heating
duct was not a controlling factor when it subsequently summarily reversed Clinton v.
Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963), giving as the only explanation a citation
to Silverman. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964). The Virginia Supreme Court
in Clinton had held that no search occurred, distinguishing Silverman because the police in
Clinton had only "stuck" the microphone into the wall rather than "intruding" through the wall
into defendant's apartment. 204 Va. at 281-82, 130 S.E.2d at 442. The Virginia Supreme
Court assumed that the "penetration" of the microphone "was very slight such as one made by
a thumb tack to hold the small device in place." 204 Va. at 281-82, 130 S.E.2d at 442.
136. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
137. As Professor Lafave maintains, "[Ilt is no overstatement to say, as the commentators
have asserted, that Katz 'marks a watershed in fourth amendment jurisprudence .... 1 " W.
LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENTr § 2.1(b), at 307 (2d ed. 1987)
(quoting Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 384).
138. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. Katz was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961)Jd. at 348 &
n. 1.
139. Id. at 348.
140. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966), quoted in Katz, 389 U.S. at 349.
141. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-50.
142. Id. at 350-51.
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presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."143 He
also rejected the policy interpretation of Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead,
which would have applied the fourth amendment to "every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed": 14
the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy againstcertain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its

protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy
at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal
privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the
protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let
alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property and
of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States. 45
As made clear by Justice Black's heated dissent, discussed
below, the
146
majority also did not use the search of interpretation.
What interpretation did Justice Stewart adopt in holding that the
government's actions in listening to Katz's conversations constituted a
search? The heart of his opinion consisted of the following three oft-quoted
sentences:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an47area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.
Read from a linguistic perspective, these three key sentences of
Stewart's opinion identified the semantic features of search out. The
"people not places" comment had the effect of excluding search of with its
semantic feature [movement through an area]. Thus, Justice Stewart
declined to describe the government's action as a search of the booth. The
next two sentences made clear that the fourth amendment protects not
simply "people," but rather "what [people] seek[] to preserve as private."'148
By making the new direct object of search "my secret" instead of "my
place," Justice Stewart indicated that an additional sense of "search" was
143. Id. at 353. For a discussion of Justice Stewart's Silverman opinion, see supra text
accompanying notes 127-35. Justice Stewart also had explicitly relied on the intrusion
interpretation in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966), written only a year before
Katz.
144. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
145. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (first emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
146. Justice Black unsuccessfully argued that only the "search of' interpretation was
legitimate:
A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can
neither be searched nor seized ....
Rather than using language in a completely
artificial way, I must conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to
eavesdropping.
Id. at 365-66 (Black, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
148. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
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search out.
For Katz, his secrets were the bets he placed.' 4 9 The government
searched out those secrets by surreptitiously listening to his phone calls. It
was the secret character of the direct object that made the government's
actions a search: Katz did not expose his bets to the public, but instead took
reasonable steps to keep his bets secret. 150 Because his bets were secret, the
government's discovery of those bets was a search. The means used by the
government were irrelevant because the semantic component of search out
is the achievement of a goal (uncovering secrets), without requiring the
concurrent accomplishment of an action, [movement through an area].
Unfortunately, Justice Stewart did not express the semantic implications of his opinion by using search out to describe the actions that he found
to violate the fourth amendment. Because he never used "search" as a verb
in the opinion, he never syntactically removed the ambiguity among the
three literal senses of search, nor did he identify by use of "search" itself the
protected direct object of the search. In fact, his opinion employed the
phrase "search and seizure" instead of the word "search" without ever
indicating whether the government's action was a search, a seizure, 15 or
both. 152 Justice Stewart's semantic intuitions were sound, but by not using a
149. Justice Stewart's opinion said that what Katz sought to preserve as private were "the
words he uttered] into the mouthpiece." Id. at 352. From a semantic perspective, however, it
is a bit shortsighted to view the utterance itself as the affected object of searching out. What
was searched out was the secret information-the bets-contained Within that utterance, just
as the object of searching in Entick and Boyd was the secret information contained within the
papers. Thus, as suggested above, see supra note 104, the absence of <affected object> in
listening is corrected by shifting attention from the utterance to the secret information
contained within the utterance, thus redescribing 'just listening" as searching out.
150. Katz was "surely entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece
[would] not be broadcast to the world." Id. at 352.
151. In Berger v. United States, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967), the Court did suggest that electronic
eavesdropping could be viewed as a seizure of words. The Court, however, has not pursued
the possibility of applying the fourth amendment to just listening through the word "seizure."
In contrast, when Congress enacted comprehensive provisions regulating wiretapping and
similar forms of electronic eavesdropping in the Crime Control Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. § 2510
(1968), it used the metaphor of seizure. The Act prohibits "interception" of "oral communications" and defines "intercept" as "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." Id. at §
2510(4) (emphasis added).
152. Justice Stewart said that "electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied.., and thus constituted a 'search
and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. His use of
quotation marks around the phrase suggests an awareness that he was using the phrase in a
nonliteral way. Stewart did not use "search" until the last paragraph of his opinion: "These
considerations [supporting the warrant requirement] do not vanish when the search in
question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a
telephone booth." Id. at 359. This single use failed to resolve the opinion's ambiguity not only
by using "search" in the noun form but also by failing to identify the direct object of the search,
referring instead to the "setting" of the search.
After finishing his discussion of whether the government's action was a "search and seizure,"
Justice Stewart closed his opinion by holding that the warrant requirement should have been
followed. See id. at 357-59. Throughout this entire latter part of his opinion, Justice Stewart
referred to the government's action neither as a search nor a seizure, but as "surveillance" or
"electronic surveillance." See id. at 354-59. Surveillance is not a good synonym for search out
because, unlike search out, surveillance does not require that the government's action uncover
secrets. Webster's defines surveillance as "close watch kept over one or more persons." See
WEBsTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICnoARY 2303 (1976). Thus, surveillance can discover
what one "knowingly exposes to the public" just as well as "what he seeks to preserve as
.
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common sense of "search" he failed to articulate them unambiguously. 153
The ambiguity of Justice Stewart's opinion is demonstrated by the
varying interpretations his fellow justices gave it. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Black accused the majority of abandoning the common sense
meaning of "search" entirely by adopting the policy interpretation:
I simply cannot in good conscience give a meaning to words which
they have never before been thought to have and which they
certainly do not have in common ordinary usage....
With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting
of the Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the
Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not
so much as a law against unreasonablesearches and seizures as one
to protect an individual's privacy. .

. Thus, by arbitrarily

substituting the Court's language, designed to protect privacy, for
the Constitution's language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth
Amendment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the
Constitution which offend the Court's broadest concept of
privacy.154
Justice Harlan began his concurring opinion by interpreting the
majority decision as a variation on the intrusion interpretation:
Ijoin the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that
an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and
unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical
intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that the invasion of a
constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court

has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a
search warrant. 155

While agreeing that the fourth amendment "protects people not places,"
Justice Harlan added the caveat that defining such fourth amendment
protection nonetheless generally "requires reference to a 'place.' 1156 It
would thus appear that Justice Harlan missed the central holding of the
not require success in achieving the goal. Compare the following expressions:
For five days the police conducted a surveillance to discover the identity of my
houseguest, without success.
For five days the police searched for the identity of my houseguest, without
success.
(?) For five days the police searched out the identity of my houseguest, without
success.
153. Justice Stewart's unarticulated reliance on his semantic intuition in Katz is perhaps
reminiscent of his famous concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) concerning
"hard-core" pornography: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to he embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it .
Id. at 197 (Stewart, J.,
I..."
concurring).

154. Katz, 347 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan also stated, "The point is... that the booth
...is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from
intrusion are recognized as reasonable." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
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majority's opinion: that fourth amendment protection was being extended
not to the booth, but to the secrets disclosed by listening to the words
spoken in the booth. Yet in the most frequently cited portion of his
concurrence, Justice Harlan, apparently realizing that the search consisted
of overhearing the conversation, not invading the booth, stated:
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because
no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the
other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected
against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable. 157
Justice Harlan's reliance on the intrusion interpretation and Justice
Black's harsh criticism of what he viewed as the substitution of policy for
constitutional text might have been prevented in Katz had Justice Stewart
expressly resolved the ambiguity of "search" by using the word itself in a
meaningful way. His failure to do so perhaps explains the seeming paradox
that the result in Katz is universally praised' 58 while the majority opinion
either is ignored or deprecated. Telford Taylor disposes of Katz's famous
"protects people not places" epigram with one almost equally memorable:
"The only merit in this comment is its brevity."' 159 Wayne LaFave, our
leading commentator on the fourth amendment, has concluded that "the
Katz opinion offers little to fill the void it has thus created."' 60
The Court itself, however, has rendered the ultimate judgment on the
force and clarity of Justicd Stewart's opinion. Although the Court almost
always begins any discussion of whether a given action is a search with
citation to Katz, often acknowledged as the "lodestar" of fourth amendment
law,16 the Court consistently cites Harlan's concurrenceas the holding of the
case. 162 The Court's gradual but profound reworking of Harlan's concurrence has enabled various justices to cite Katz as authority for reliance on
the search of ,163 intrusion, 64 policy, 65 and search out 166 interpretations.
157. Id. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan further stated that
the Court implicitly overruled Olmstead because Olmstead "essentially rested on the ground that
conversations were not subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 362 n.*

(Harlan, J., concurring).
158. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 382, 385; Kamisar, The "PolicePractice"Phases

of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court in THE BURGER YEARs: RIo-s
WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1969-1986, at 143, 158 n. 70 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987).
159. T. TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 112.

AND

160. W. LAFAvE,supra note 137, § 2.1(b), at 307 (quoting Note, FromPrivatePlacesto Personal
Privacy:A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 968, 976 (1968)).
161. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
162. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 525 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).

163. See, e.g., Oliver, 466 U.S at 177.
164. See e.g., Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (relying on fact that observations were "physically

nonintrusive" while simultaneously denying any repudiation of Katz).
165, See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that literal search of
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Sometimes one finds the lodestar shining over a case in which almost all the
interpretations are tangled into the same opinion. 167 Thus, the ambiguity
and vagueness of Justice Stewart's opinion in Katz has spawned the
incoherence of today's fourth amendment law.
VI.

LIMITING THE SEARCH OUT INTERPRETATION: THE REQUIREMENT OF
LEGITIMACY

One possible, result of Justice Stewart's ambiguity was that Katz could
be interpreted as including search for in the meaning of "unreasonable
searches."'168 Edmund Kitch, for example, seemed to come to that conclusion in an early comment: "[Katz] extends the Fourth Amendment prohibition to every nonconsensual government investigation .... ,"169 Given the
obvious ramifications of such an inclusive interpretation of "search," it is
not surprising that the Court's first important reworking of Katz, United
States v. White,' 70 dealt with this issue.
White presented facts similar to the pre-Katz case of On Lee v. United
States. 17 1 Both cases involved what has come to be called participant
monitoring: government agents overhear a conversation through a microphone voluntarily worn by one of the participants in the conversation. 7 2 In
White the agents overheard a total of eight conversations between White
and the informant, Jackson. Four conversations were in Jackson's home,
two were in Jackson's car, one was in a restaurant, and the other was in
White's home.' 73 Because the prosecution was unable to produce Jackson at
trial, the trial court allowed the agents to testify to the conversations they
overheard by use of the concealed microphone worn by Jackson. 174 The
court of appeals, assuming On Lee was overruled by Katz,' 75 reversed the
176
trial court.

prisoner's cell was not a "search" within meaning of fourth amendment by balancing privacy
interests of prisoners against security needs of prison officials). The court's explicit policy
interpretation began by citing Katz as authority for the need to determine whether "a
'justifiable' expectation of privacy is at stake." Id. at 525.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-15 (1984); cf id. at 733-735 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. For example, see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), discussed
at infra text accompanying notes 318-46, and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984),
discussed at infra text accompanying notes 271-86.
168. Indeed, as discussed above, see supra note 152, his reliance on "surveillance" to describe
the government's activity suggested (probably inadvertently) a search for interpretation.
169. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits ofthe FourthAmendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133,
134.
170. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
171. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749-50 (1950). For a discussion of On Lee, see
supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
172. See White, 401 U.S. at 746-47 (White, J., plurality opinion).
173. Id. at 747 (White, J., plurality opinion).
174. Id. (White, J., plurality opinion).
175. Katz was decided by the Supreme Court between the close of White's trial and the court
of appeals decision. See United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838, 848 (7th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
176. See id.
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The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 177 holding that no
search occurred, but no single opinion commanded a majority. Writing for
a plurality that included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Blackmun, Justice White was preoccupied with the task of reconciling Katz
with a trilogy of cases decided shortly before Katz that had exempted the
use of undercover informants from the scope of the fourth amendment:
Hoffa v. United States, 178 Lopez v. United States,179 and Lewis v. United States.' 80
Each of these three cases, like On Lee, had been decided in terms of the
intrusion interpretation; the informants had not "intruded" into what were
admittedly constitutionally protected areas' s ' because in each case they
entered with the occupant's consent. Beneath this rather mechanical
application of the intrusion interpretation was the concern, explicitly stated
in Lewis, that also seemed to underlie the decision in White: "Were we to
hold the deceptions of the agent in this case constitutionally prohibited, we
of undercover agents in any manner
would come near to a rule that the use
82
is virtually unconstitutional per se.'

83
After reaffirming the Katz rejection of the intrusion interpretation,
Justice White proceeded to apply what at first appeared to be search out
analysis to hold that no search occurred in the earlier trilogy or in White
itself. His starting premise was that "one contemplating illegal activities
must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the
police."' 8 4 If Justice White meant that the contents of a conversation cease
to be secret the moment that a government spy participates in the
conversation, then from the perspective of the search out interpretation he
was correct in refusing to distinguish White from the Hoffa-Lopez-Lewis
trilogy. If what the defendant in White said to Jackson was not secret, then
the agent's additional listening did not search out anything, just as covertly
listening to the President's State of the Union address would not be a
search. Viewed in this light, Justice White's opinion seems to rest on one of
the connotations of search out in the fourth amendment: <X is secret>.
Justice White realized, however, that he had a problem using the
search out interpretation. After all, information shared in a conversation
does not, from a common sense perspective, automatically cease to be
secret; otherwise, the phrase "secret conversation" would be a contradiction
in terms. Indeed, Katz itself would be undone since what the government
heard also was revealed to the person at the other end of the telephone line.

177. See White, 401 U.S. at 754 (White, J., plurality opinion).
178. 385 U.S. 293, 301-03 (1966).

179. 373 U.S. 427, 439-40 (1963).
180. 385 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1966).

181. In Lewis the agent entered the defendant's home, see Leuis, 385 U.S. at 206-07; in Hoffa
the informant entered Jimmy Hoffa's hotel suite, see Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 296-98; and in Lopez the
agent entered the defendant's private office, see Lopez, 373 U.S. at 429-32.
182. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210. Indeed such a rule could extend even further, as Kitch feared,
see supra text accompanying note 169, so that all searching for evidence of crime could come
under the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment.
183. Justice White noted, "Katz ... swept away doctrines that electronic eavesdropping is
permissible under the Fourth Amendment unless physical invasion of a constitutionally
protected area produced the challenged evidence." United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 748
(White, J., plurality opinion).
184. Id. at 752.

A SEARCH FOR COMMON SENSE
Why, then, could Katz reasonably expect the words he uttered into the
telephone to be secret while White could not have the same expectation
regarding his conversations with Jackson in the privacy of a car or his own
home? Justice White found his answer by exploiting yet another ambiguous
word found in Justice Harlan's Katz concurrence.
Justice Harlan insisted in his Katz concurrence that an actual subjective
expectation of privacy was not sufficient to invoke fourth amendment
protection: "the expectation [must also] be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' "18-5 This distinction between subjective and
"reasonable" expectations simply seemed to be an expansion on the
majority's comment that Katz had 'justifiably" relied on the expected
privacy afforded by the telephone booth.' 8 6 Both Justices Stewart and
Harlan seemed to have the same reasonableness requirement in mind: the
person claiming fourth amendment protection must have taken the steps
any reasonable person would have taken in order to expect privacy.18 7 This
requirement that an expectation of secrecy be objectively reasonable is
consistent with interpreting Katz as an example of the search out interpreof search out must in fact have
tation, which requires that the direct object
88
been secret prior to the searching out.

Justice Harlan's two-pronged test thus objectifies a claim of secrecy.
The first prong requires that the defendant exhibit behavior demonstrating
his expectations of secrecy. 189 The second prong applies a reasonable
person standard to those expectations. Both prongs of the test can be
applied by the police officer in the street. She can tell whether secrecy is
sought by observable signals, such as a drawn curtain, a closed door, or a
lowered voice. She can then test that exhibited expectation against her own
common sense knowledge of how reasonable people protect secrets.
However, "reasonable" can be ambiguous. In the two following
expressions, "reasonable" has different senses:

185. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 348, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 353.
187. LaFave, for example, has acknowledged that this is a plausible interpretation of the
Harlan concurrence:
Sometimes the Court has referred to the Katz rule as the "reasonable 'expectation
of privacy' " test. From this, it might be assumed that police investigative activity
constitutes a search whenever it uncovers incriminating actions or objects which the
law's hypothetical reasonable man would expect to be private, that is, which as a
matter of statistical probability were not likely to be discovered.
W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.1(d), at 311 (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan's example of an
unreasonable expectation-that "conversations in the open would not be... overheard," Katz,
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)-seems consistent with this reasonable person
standard.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 85-98, 147-50. The semantic features of "secret"
also seem to indicate that secrecy is treated semantically as an objective fact, as illustrated by
this expression: "I thought my motive was a secret, although I later found out it was not."
189. I use "expectation of secrecy" rather than "expectation of privacy" to describe the
holding of Katz because privacy is both broader and narrower than secrecy. For example,
something that is not private property may nonetheless be exposed to public view. On the
other hand, privacy connotes a right to be private, whereas secret has no normative
implications one way or the other.
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It was reasonable for Katz to expect that no one could hear his end
of the telephone conversation.
It was reasonable for Katz to refuse to talk to the police until his
lawyer arrived.
In the first expression, Katz's expectation is reasonable because it is normal,
typical. In the second expression, Katz's refusal is reasonable because it is
normative, that is, legitimate. 190 Justice Harlan's reference to expectations
that "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' "191 opened the door to
interpreting "reasonable" as legitimate, since society is usually the source of
normative judgments. In White Justice White slid through that door and, as
we shall see, most of the other Justices eventually joined him.
Justice White said he was not concerned with "what the privacy
expectations of particular defendants in particular situations may be, or the
extent to which they relied on the discretion of their companions."' 92
Rather, the determinative issue was whether an "interest legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved."'1 93 For Justice White, the
defendant's interest in keeping his conversations with Jackson secret could
not be legitimate because, as already held in Hoffa, "a wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it" is not a legitimate interest. 1 4 Legitimate
expectations of privacy were thus defined as those expectations that society
will protect by law, specifically the fourth amendment.X9 5Justice White thus
reinterpreted Katz, applying Justice Stewart's own word for "reasonable,"
'justifiable": "Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz,
is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally justifiable-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a warrant."' 96
As Anthony Amsterdam has pointed out, this reformulation of Katz
turns its holding into a question-begging tautology: "the fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim fourth amendment
protection."'19 7 Thus, the requirement that privacy expectations be legitimate has transformed what at first appeared to be a semantic question-is
a given government action a search-into a value judgment-should a
given government action be regulated by the fourth amendment. Reinterpreting Katz in terms of legitimate expectations of privacy has fulfilled
Justice Black's prophecy that Katz would open the door to the policy
interpretation, but in an unexpected way: the policy interpretation has
190. These two senses are obviously closely related because we often judge whether
behavior is normatively correct by whether it is typical. Webster's Dictionary reveals this
interrelationship of meaning when it offers as a definition of "reasonable" the following subtle
shift from typical to legitimate: "not extreme... moderate... rational." WEBTER'S THIRI NEW
INTERNATION.AL DICTMIONARY
1892 (1976).
191. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It is interesting that
this phrase is the only point in his opinion where Justice Harlan put quotation marks around
"reasonable," perhaps signalling that he was using the words in an unusual or specialized

sense.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

White, 401 U.S. at 751.
White, 401 U.S. at 749 (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302) (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302).
Id. at 752 ("the law permits the frustration of actual expectations of privacy").
Id.
Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 385.
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been used to restrict rather than expand the meaning created by the use of
a literal sense of search (search out). Even if a reasonable person in White's
shoes would not have expected his conversation partner to be relaying his
words to anyone else, no search occurred because the Court has made a
value judgment in favor of the use of government informers.
Justice Harlan assumed that Justice White's opinion was founded on
the policy interpretation and joined battle on those terms in his oft-cited
dissent:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search -for subjective
expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our
expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections
of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past
and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as
mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the
expectations and risks without examining the desirability of
saddling them on society. The critical question is whether under
our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we
should impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.
This question must, in my view, be answered by assessing the
nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact
on the individual's sense of security balanced against the utility of
198
the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.
Justice Harlan thus made explicit Justice White's tacit adoption of the
policy interpretation and then articulated his view of the underlying policy
of the fourth amendment: a warrant should be required before undertaking an investigative practice if the practice's threat to the individual's sense
of security outweighs its utility as a law enforcement tool. Thus, to say that
a challenged practice is a search under the fourth amendment is merely to
state in a shorthand way that the practice is more threatening to personal
security than it is useful for law enforcement. In a conversation based on
Justice Harlan's policy interpretation, speakers will agree that a given action
is a search only if they understand, share, and identically balance the same
values. In contrast, semantic analysis only requires common sense for
meaningful communication.
Viewed in terms of the policy interpretation, the debate between
Justices White and Harlan seems to have turned on the potential impact on
the individual's sense of security if fleeting conversations are made indelible. Justice White assumed that the fact a spy was wearing a microphone
added no additional threat to personal security. 199 Justice Harlan, on the

198. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
199. Justice White asserted: "Given the possibility or probability that one of his colleagues
is cooperating with the police, it is only speculative to assert that the defendant's utterances
would be substantially different or his sense of security any less if he also thought it possible
that the suspected colleague is wired for sound." Id. at 752.
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other hand, felt confident that "words would be measured a good deal more
carefully and communication inhibited if one suspected his conversations
were being transmitted and transcribed. '200 A decision to leave participant
monitoring outside the constraints of the fourth amendment "might well
smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous,
impetuous, sacrilegious
'20 1
and defiant discourse-that liberates daily life."

Justice Harlan also responded to what he suspected was a hidden
thumb on the scale in Justice White's analysis: that the person complaining
of the participant monitoring was,
in Justice White's words, a person
"contemplating illegal activities," 20 2 a "wrongdoer. '20 3 As Justice Harlan
pointed out, the result in White did not sanction participant monitoring only
of criminals. By exempting participant monitoring totally from the fourth
amendment, the Court explicitly licensed the government to engage in the
practice even where it has 2no
suspicion that the subject of the practice is
04
engaged in illegal activities.
The White decision thus demonstrates a serious problem with using the
policy interpretation to interpret "search" as an operative word in the
fourth amendment. If the justification for the outcome in White was that the
participant monitoring served a valuable law enforcement purpose, 20 5 we
would expect a different outcome whenever the government used it for a
different purpose, such as spying on political strategy sessions in the
headquarters of the opposing political party.2 0 6 Yet White's precedential
authority is that participant monitoring for any purpose falls outside the
protections of the fourth amendment.2 0 7 Thus, all the subtle identification
and weighing of values coritemplated by the policy interpretation is lost
when the Court uses that approach to declare that a generic category of
200. Id. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Harlan. J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 752.
203. Id. at 749 (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302).
204. Id. at 789 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the result does "not simply mandate that criminals
must daily run the risk of unknown eavesdroppers prying into their private affairs; it subjects
each and every law-abiding member of society to that risk."). A thorough criticism of the
concept of a "wrongdoer's exception" is found in Grano, supra note 10, at 432-38. Grano,
however, took the position in his article that a government investigative practice that only
revealed a person's propensity to crime, like a sting operation, should not be considered a
search because the ultimate purpose of the fourth amendment is to preclude conduct that
might intrude upon innocent privacy expectations. Id. at 437; see also Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Devicefor Protectingthe Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229 (1983). In considering
this argument, it is perhaps worth recalling that John Wilkes was eventually judged guilty of

seditious libel, see N. LssoN, supra note 52, at 49, and that some of the colonial leaders who
most vigorously opposed the writs of assistance were undoubtedly smugglers. For example,
John Hancock's sloop, "The Liberty," was seized in 1768 by the British for bringing in Madeira
wines without payment of duties, provoking a substantial colonial riot. Id. at 72.
205. See White, 401 U.S. at 753-54 (plurality opinion) (value of participant monitoring for

producing accurate and reliable trial testimony not dependent on availability or credibility of
informant).
206. Perhaps in 1971 such a possible abuse of governmental power might not have seemed

as likely as it would have four years later.
207. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (plurality opinion). Justice White's opinion has come to be
treated as an authoritative holding even though it commanded only four votes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
752 (1971)).
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governmental activity never can be considered a search. However, the
opposite use of the policy interpretation, to weigh each challenged instance
of governmental action on its facts, presents equally serious problems, as
pointed out by Amsterdam:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment.... [But] it
is a perfectly impossible question for the Supreme Court to put
forth as a test of fourth amendment coverage.
It is impossible because, in the first and most important
instance, the fourth amendment speaks to the police and must
speak to them intelligibly. How in the devil is a policeman
engaged in an investigation supposed to decide whether the form
of surveillance that he proposes to use, if not restricted by the
fourth amendment, would curtail the liberties of citizens to a
20 8
compass inconsistent with a free society?
As used in White, the policy interpretation seemed to have transformed
"search" into a specialized legal term that was vague at exactly the moment
when clarity was most needed. For either Justice White or Justice Harlan to
use the word "search" added no information to explain the conclusion
reached; it merely stated the conclusion. For each, his conclusion was not
based on a sense of "search" common to him and the other Justice (or to
anyone else, such as the parties), but instead was explained by expressions
that did not use the word "search." By abandoning semantic common sense,
the justices also missed an opportunity to use the semantic potential of the
search out interpretation to understand and resolve the issue before them
in a different way.
Despite their disagreements, neither Justice White nor Justice Harlan
questioned the soundness of the underlying Lewis and Hoffa cases. 20 9 Yet
the possibility of police infiltration and spying has an impact on one's sense
of security and spontaneity possibly greater even than wiretapping. 2 10 As
mentioned earlier,2 11 one suspects that both Justices were unwilling to
subject all undercover police work to the restrictions of the warrant clause.
When Kitch observed that Katz appeared to apply fourth amendment
prohibitions to all searching for, he suggested that the Court would need to
208. Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 403-04. Amsterdam characteristically added: "And, even
if that were a question that a policeman could practicably answer, I would frankly not want the
extent of my freedom to be determined by a policeman's answer to it." Id. at 404. For an
eloquent demonstration of how the fourth amendment can and should be considered as the
basis for an idealized conversation-not in a courtroom between two lawyers-but on the
street between the police officer and the citizen, see generally White, The FourthAmendment as
a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 165 (1975).
209. Justice Harlan did seriously question Lopez, which he had authored, because in
retrospect he thought that the fact the agent in Lopez had a tape recorder in his pocket
(although no other agents were monitoring the conversation) threatened spontaneous speech
as did the participant monitoring in White. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 788 n.24
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
210. Amsterdam makes this point in a telling way with an anecdote about a civil rights
group that feared the presence of a government spy because of leaked secret information. To
resolve the crisis, the group's leader falsely told the members that the police had obtained the
information through a wiretap. Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 407-08 ("It had to be the bug.
If it was a spy, the movement would have torn itself apart.").
211. See supra text accompanying note 182.
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"seek a limiting principle to replace that of Olmstead.''212 The search out
interpretation does utilize a more limited sense of "search" than search for,
because the government must in fact uncover information that was
objectively secret. Our semantic common sense about the meaning of
"secret" can help distinguish between police investigation generally and the
use of spies, and even between different types of spying.
To determine whether information shared in a conversation was
secret, common sense tells us to ask questions about the nature of the
relationship between the two participants in the conversation. "Shared
secret" is a coherent expression but it assumes a social world divided in two
between "we few" and "the others." 2 13 In this world, information remains
secret as long as the others do not know it. Of course the division of the
social world will vary according to the context of usage. We few may be a
family, a circle of close friends, top management of a company, a political
leader's closest advisors, or a criminal conspiracy. Common to all shared
secrets, however, is an assumption of trust and confidentiality among the
few. Indeed, we probably feel that if secrecy is to be maintained, the level
of trust and confidentiality must increase as the number of persons
included in the few increases. 21 4 A secret society like the Ku Klux Klan is
secret not only because its membership is known only to the few, but also
because strong bonds among its members, reinforced by pledges and
rituals, allow the members to feel secure in sharing their secrets within the
society.
Under the search out interpretation, then, activity of an undercover
agent, including participant monitoring, is not a search if it was objectively
unreasonable for the one giving the agent information to consider that
information secret. For example, in Lewis the agent was a total stranger who
called Lewis, identified himself as "Jimmy the Pollack [sic]," and asked if
Lewis could sell him narcotics. Lewis answered affirmatively and invited
"Jimmy" to his house to conduct the transaction. 21 5 It seems under these
circumstances Lewis would have defied common sense if he tried to
212. See Kitch, supra note 169, at 134.
213. Webster's Dictionary defines "secret" as "something kept from the knowledge of others
or shared only confidentially with a few." WFBS-rsR's THIR NEW IZ%-riRATIONAL DICTONARY 2052
(1976). The disjunctive nature of this definition suggests that an expression using just the
word "secret" is somewhat vague and requires an answer to the question "secret from whom?"
to be fully meaningful.
214. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., the Court held that a warrantless government inspection
of a corporation's plant violated the fourth amendment. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 324 (1978). The Court rejected the government's argument that the corporation
could not expect privacy as to the discovered safety violations because its own employees could
see the violations. See id. at 314-15. Grano interprets this decision as making clear "that there
is a constitutional difference between disclosing information ...to select individuals and
making information... available to any member of the general public." Grano, supra note 10,
at 432 n.70. One wonders whether a group as large as a work force could be considered as "we
few." For an example of a corporation's efforts to preserve secrecy by limiting employee access
and controlling employee disclosure of information, see the discussion of Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), infra note 321. Of course, as held in Marshall, the
warrantless entry into a corporation's plant is also a search of the plant prohibited by the fourth
amendment even if no secrets are searched out. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 314-15.
215. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207 (1966).
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describe his narcotics peddling as a secret. On the other hand, the Hoffa case
involved the then-Teamsters president's trusted confidant, whom the
216
Thus, it seems
government persuaded to spy in exchange for leniency.
secret and
that Hoffa's alleged plan to tamper with a jury was objectively
21 7
would have remained so but for the government's conduct.
A simple "sting" operation, such as when the police set up a front as a
fencing operation, is unlikely to search out secrets because the thief who
deals with an unknown fence cannot plausibly claim that he expected the
transaction to be secret.2 1 8 The defendant in Lopez also could not claim that
219
the government searched out his criminal plan to bribe an IRS agent.
Although the agent did deliberately appear receptive to the bribe attempt
in several meetings while he carried a hidden tape recorder, the "cat was let
out of the bag" at the first meeting between the agent and Lopez when a
bribe offer was made. 22 0 Certainly at that point Lopez had no reason to
believe that the agent would either accept the bribe, and thus join a
conspiracy of two, or keep quiet about the offer.
The White case appears to present the more difficult situation in which
the undercover agent deliberately insinuates himself into the suspect's
confidences. White and Jackson met at least eight times, including in each
other's home. 221 Under a reasonable person approach to expectations of
secrecy, the test would be whether their relationship had developed to the
point at which it was reasonable for White to assume that Jackson would
honor his confidences. Perhaps one appeal of the search out interpretation
is that it would bring fourth amendment protections to bear only on
insinuous forms of spying that destroy trusting relationships, either by
corrupting an existing relationship or creating trust only with the intent of
abusing it.222
One of the striking ironies of fourth amendment law is the continuing
force of Justice Harlan's opinions in Katz and White, even though neither
216. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296-98 (1966).
217. The conversation in question took place in Hoffa's hotel suite during a criminal trial.
Had the friend voluntarily turned informant after the conversation, we would not say that the
government searched out the information conveyed by the informant because there would
have been no action by the government with the necessary [purpose to find]. The lower courts
apparently concluded that the government had not placed the informer in Hoffa's councils,
and Justices Clark and Douglas, dissenting, would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted for that reason. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 321 (Clark, J., & Douglas, J.,
dissenting). For Grano, as well, "the distinction between tattletales and spies is constitutionally
significant." Grano, supra note 10, at 437 n. 10.
218. Of course such a thief would probably like the transaction to be secret, but therein lies
the useful distinction made in Harlan's Katz concurrence between subjective and reasonable
expectations.
219. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 429-32 (1963).
220. See id. at 429-30.
221. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971).
222. Cf United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262, 264-66 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
2461 (1987) (due process not violated when government agent initiated sexual liaison with
defendant's live-in girl friend solely to gain information against defendant). John LeCarre's
splendid spy thriller, The Little Drummer Girl (1983)(subsequently made into a movie starring
Klaus Kinski and Dianne Keaton), is built on the premise that a spy who plays a role to gain
trust will, if successful, tend to so sympathize with the intended victim as to ultimately deserve
the trust confided in him or her.
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commanded any votes but his own. All courts now cite Katz as the standard
authority for the current "definition" of "search" as a violation of a
"legitimate expectation of privacy." 223 Scholars such as LaFave praise
Harlan's White dissent as the best articulation of the policy interpretation,
which is seen as the interpretation underlying the legitimate expectation of
privacy rule: "the great virtue of the Katz decision is that it ...

permits a

reasoned value judgment to be made concerning what types of police
surveillance are not to go unregulated by constitutional restraints.

'224

Given such wide acceptance of the policy interpretation, another irony is
that when the Court employed that approach in its next two major
interpretations of "search" after White, the two decisions
drew almost
225
universal scholarly criticism, including from LaFave.
Although Justice White used the word "legitimately" in his White
opinion, 226 the phrase "legitimate expectation of privacy" seems to have
first entered the Court's vocabulary five years after White in the muchcriticized case of United States v. Miller.227 The defendant in Miller challenged the government's subpoena of copies of his cancelled checks,
statements, and other records from his bank. 228 Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell held that no search took place because of the "lack of any
legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank
records. '229 Whether Miller actually expected his bank records to be kept
secret was not the point, Justice Powell reasoned, because the Court already
had decided in White and the Hoffa-Lopez-Lewis trilogy that it was not
legitimate to expect privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to another

person:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party
223. See, e.g., supra note 162.
224. W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.3(c), at 401; see also id. § 2.1(d), at 310-14. One would
think from reading LaFave's treatise that Amsterdam joins him in praising the use of the policy
interpretation. In fact, Amsterdam's assessment is more complex, almost paradoxical. Immediately after declaring that Katz, and indeed the fourth amendment itself, demands an answer
to a question based on values (What extent of unregulated surveillance can be permitted
without diminishing too greatly the privacy and freedom needed in a free and open society?),
he goes on to say that this is "a devastating question to put to a committee [i.e., the Supreme
Court]" and "a perfectly impossible ... test of fourth amendment coverage." Amsterdam,
supra note 10, at 403.
225. For LaFave's criticism of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), see infra note
227. For his criticism of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), see infra note 241. See also
Kamisar, supra note 158, at 158.
226. See United States v. White 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (White, J., plurality opinion).
227. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Some critical commentaries on Miller are collected by LaFave, see
W. LAFAvE, supra note 137, § 2.7(c), at 511. LaFave himself abandons the restraint customary
to his treatise and terms Miller "dead wrong" and the Court's reasoning "woefully inadequate."
Id. For another critique of Miller, see Grano, supra note 10, at 438-44.
228. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436. The subpoena clearly did not comply with the warrant
requirement since it was issued by the prosecutor rather than an impartial magistrate. Id. at
439.
229. Id. at 442. His opinion also was a harbinger of what hindsight now reveals to be Justice
Powell's attraction to the intrusion interpretation; he described the Court's decision as finding
"there was no intrusion into any area in which respondent had a protected Fourth Amendment interest." Id. at 440.
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and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
23 0
will not be betrayed.
Of course Miller differs from the spying cases in at least two major
ways. First, the customer's expectation that the bank will treat his records as
confidential is clearly legitimate in some sense inasmuch as state law
generally requires such confidentiality.23 1 Second, the information
searched out by the government is not knowingly revealed to the bank in
the same way that information is given to the spy. The government in Miller
was not really searching out the individual records, but rather information
about business dealings and relationships that can be deduced only by
studying a range of records. Bank customers do not knowingly reveal that
kind of information to their banks because they hardly expect bank
employees to assemble and study their records. Rather, they expect the
bank to look at each document only in the course of processing it.232
The Court apparently invoked the policy interpretation to overrule
these objections, but failed to articulate the policies that were being weighed
and resolved. Instead, Justice Powell simply referred to a prior decision,
CaliforniaBankers Association v. Shultz, 233 as authority for the assertion that
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records. 23 4 California
Bankers was a decision upholding the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy
236
Act of 1970235 against a variety of challenges by a variety of plaintiffs.
The Act laid the groundwork for the procedure used in Miller by requiring
banks to retain microfilm copies of all cancelled checks and other customer
documents. 237 The CaliforniaBankers decision merely held that the government did not conduct a search simply by requiring banks to keep certain
types of depositor records, specifically reserving judgment on the fourth
amendment implications of an effort by the government to compel
production of those records.23 8 California Bankers offered neither the
230. Id. at 443.
231. See Note, Government Access to Bank Records, 83 YALE L.J. 1439, 1464 (1974) (law of
agency imposes qualified legal duty of confidentiality on banks); see also Miller,425 U.S. at 449
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Representatives of several banks testified ... that information in
their possession regarding a customer's account is deemed by them to be confidential." (citing
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 243, 529 P.2d 590, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 169
(1974))).
232. For this reason LaFave places Miller in the category of "surveillance of relationships
and movements." See W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.7(c), at 508-17.
233. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
234. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440-41.
235. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083,
1101-1105, 1121-1122 (1970).
236. See CaliforniaBankers, 416 U.S. at 77-78.
237. See id. at 30-31.
238. See id. at 54 n.24. The Court, however, through imprecise language, created the broad
dicta used later in Miller when it said that the required record keeping "neither searches nor
seizes records in which the depositor has a FourthAmendment right." Id. at 54 (emphasis added). In
semantic terms, the act of a bank in keeping records is: (1) not a search in any of the three
senses because it is not action taken with a [purpose to find]; (2) not a searching out because
it does not uncover anything (at that point there is no disclosure to anyone outside the
confidential relationship); and (3) not a search of because it does not entail [movement
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opportunity nor the justification for deciding categorically that bank
records are outside the scope of the fourth amendment. 23 9 Yet that is
precisely how the Miller Court used California Bankers to avoid wrestling
with the difficult policy issues directly, employing the vagueness of "legitimate" to cover the absence of either semantic common sense or reasoned
policy judgment.
By the time the Court decided Smith v. Maryland,2 40 which along with
Miller tops the chart of most-criticized fourth amendment cases, 24' the
"legitimate expectation of privacy" phrase had become solidly entrenched
in fourth amendment vocabulary. 242 It was Smith, however, that explicitly
through an area], The Court in CaliforniaBankers alluded to the absence of the [movement]
feature when it pointed out that the Act and its implementing regulations "do not authorize
indiscriminate rummagingamong the records of the plaintiffs." Id. at 62 (emphasis added). For
the difference between a search of papers and searching out information contained in papers,
see the discussion of Boyd v. United States, supra note 94 and accompanying text. In a different
part of the CaliforniaBankers opinion than that cited in Miller, the Court also held, on grounds
solely of policy, that required reporting of certain types of large fund transfers did not violate
the fourth amendment. See California Bankers, 416 U.S. at 63.
239. CaliforniaBankers presented a fairly ideal opportunity to use the policy interpretation.
Congress had conducted extensive hearings on the pros and cons of the procedures at issue
and the Court had the benefit of that legislative record as well as the participation in the
litigation by the Secretary of the Treasury, major banking organizations, and the ACLU. See
id. at 27, 41. But even then, the policy interpretation could only have validated the specific
procedures of the Act, which themselves represented the careful balancing of competing
values. This application of the policy interpretation would not have resulted in a decision that
bank records never are protected by the fourth amendment, but only that the fundamental
policy underlying the amendment was not violated by the specific procedures authorized
under the Act.
240. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
241. Without canvassing the criticism of Smith, I note again LaFave's atypically harsh
critique: "[Smith is] a crabbed interpretation of the Katz text [which] makes a mockery of the
Fourth Amendment." W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.7(b), at 507; see alsoJ. CHOPER, Y. KA.IISAR
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOP.IEr'S 1978-1979, at 134-45 (1979) (remarks
& L. TRIBE, THE SUrREMNE
of Kamisar).
242. Much of the credit for this entrenchment is due to Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), and in particular one long footnote devoted to
the subject of "legitimacy," id. at 143 n.12. Rakas merged standing doctrine and substantive
fourth amendment law by holding that the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends . ..upon whether the person who claims the protection of the
Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Id. at 143. In both
Rakas and a subsequent standing case, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), Justice
Rehnquist used "legitimate" to obscure the difference between search of and search out. Id. at
104-06. In both cases, evidence that incriminated the defendant was found in a search of an
area belonging to another. In Rakas the evidence was found in the glove compartment of a car
in which the defendant was a passenger. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130. In Rawlings the defendant
deposited illegal drugs in a friend's purse moments before the police arrived on the scene. See
Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 100-02. Justice Rehnquist concluded that neither defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in relation to the evidence uncovered because neither had
such an expectation as to the area searched. See id. at 104-06; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49. But of
course the Court in Katz had insisted on protecting people, and their secrets, not merely places.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 349, 351 (1967). Justice Rehnquist silently undermined Katz
by ignoring the possibility of a search out interpretation, which would have forced the
question: Under what circumstances can a reasonable person expect to keep something secret
if it was placed in a friend's glove compartment or purse? The answer, as in the spying cases,
probably would depend significantly on the relationship between the defendant and the
friend.
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redefined "search" in terms of legitimacy. 243 At issue was the pen register,
a device used by the telephone company at the request of the police to
record all telephone numbers dialed from a particular telephone. 244 The
contents of the phone calls were not recorded. 245 By use of a pen register the
police identified Smith as the man who was making certain threatening and
obscene phone calls to a particular person. 246 Although Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court, doubted that Smith had even a subjective expectation
that the numbers he dialed were private, he concluded that Smith's
expectations were irrelevant because of the legitimacy factor:
petitioner in all probability entertained no actual expectation of
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and.., even if he did,
his expectation was not "legitimate." The installation and use of a
pen register, consequently, was not a "search." 247
If Smith did expect that the government would not know the telephone numbers dialed from his home, that expectation would not have
been legitimate according to Justice Blackmun because the Court already
had decided in Miller and White "that a person has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. '248 Of
course, by relying on these precedents the Court adopted their flaws, which
were equally, if not more, present in the pen register situation. Customers
do not "knowingly" expose their relationships with others to telephone
companies when they dial a number-or to banks when they use checks.
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that local calls no longer are handled by
potentially nosy human operators, but rather are processed by computers
that will not "remember" the numbers dialed unless programmed to do
so. 249 His statement that Smith "assumed the risk that the company would

reveal to police the numbers he dialed"250 not only ascribed an implausible
state of mind to the defendant, but also ignored the total lack of choice for
Smith or any citizen. The only way to avoid revealing the identity of the
people one chooses to talk with by telephone, under Smith, is to forgo
telephone communication.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, correctly interpreted the majority opinion
as resting on the policy interpretation: "whether privacy expectations are
legitimate within the meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an
individual can be presumed to accept when imparting information to third
parties, but on the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open
243. It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart, the author of Katz, dissented in Smith in an
opinion that clearly used the search out interpretation. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,

748 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (the information obtained by use of the pen register was
protected under Katz because "it easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places
called and thus reveal the most intimate [i.e., secret] details of a person's life.").
244. See id. at 737.
245. Id. at 741.
246. Id. at 737.
247. Id. at 745-46.
248. Id. at 743-44.

249. See id. at 744-45. He also was aware that the current billing practice of telephone
companies was not to record local calls. See id. at 745.
250. Id. at 744.
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society. ''251 Once again the majority and dissent joined battle on the
grounds of the policy interpretation, and, once again, the majority failed to
respond with a reasoned policy argument. All that Justice Blackmun had to
say was that perhaps in some cases, but not this one, a value judgment
would have to be made:
if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide
television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any
actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware
of this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were
continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective
expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be
lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an individual's
subjective expectations had begn "conditioned" by influences
alien to well recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those
subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in
ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of privacy"
2 52
existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.
Justice Blackmun simply assumed that a police practice of monitoring
phone numbers was not an "influence alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms," but he neither admitted to making what was
obviously a value judgment, nor did he attempt to defend his assumption.
He thus demonstrated the weakness of his proposed method for protecting
American society from transformation into a totalitarian state. In Smith the
Court made no normative inquiry because the majority refused to consider
the possibility that the practice might be "alien" to basic fourth amendment
policies. By exploiting the ambiguity of the word "reasonable," the Court
spoke as if it were merely evaluating the state of mind of the reasonable
telephone user-a proper standard under the search out interpretationwhile in fact making an unarticulated and undefended policy decision that
the identity of persons called by telephone was not an interest worthy of
2
fourth amendment protection. 53
After the Court decided Smith in 1979 it appeared that the preliminary
inquiry in most fourth amendment cases-whether the challenged action is
a search-no longer depended on the meaning of any word, but on a rule
of legitimacy that subsumed the entire analysis. Prosecutors, defendants,
the lower judiciary, and, most important, the police were in a quandary.
251. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall then quoted Justice Harlan's

dissent in White in support of his contention that "courts must evaluate the 'intrinsic character'
of investigative practices with reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 740 n.5.Justice Blackmun apparently failed to consider that freedom from police
monitoring of telephone conversations had been a "well-established" fourth amendment right
for only twelve years. (Katz was decided in 1967; Smith was decided in 1979.)
253. Yale Kamisar has made a similar criticism of the "voluntariness" terminology in confession cases obscuring underlying and poorly articulated policy choices. See Kamisar, What is
an "Involuntay" Confession?: Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions, 17 RUTroERs L. REv. 728, 759 (1963).
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The post-Katz cases had failed to provide either semantic or policy guidance
in applying this newly unfamiliar word: "search." Something was a search
only if it infringed a legitimate privacy interest, and it seemed the only way
to find out if an interest was legitimate was to obtain a ruling from the
Supreme Court.
The result of this intolerable situation 254 has been two-fold. First, the
Court has added new categories of searches conducted without a warrant
that are nonetheless "reasonable," thus employing the policy interpretation
to interpret the second rather than the third word in the fourth amendment
phrase "against unreasonablesearches and seizures." 255 The implications of
this development are beyond the scope of this article. The second consequence has been a partial return to reliance on the search of and intrusion
interpretations, apparently in an almost unconscious effort to restore some
degree of certainty and common sense to the task of deciding whether a
256
given action by the government is a search.
VII.

RENEWED CONFUSION OVER INTRUSION

A.

Unprotected Areas

The Court's 1984 decision in Oliver v. United States 257 applied the

legitimacy rule in a way not heretofore discussed: to exclude from the
meaning of "search" actions that clearly were searches of from a common
sense point of view. Oliver involved two factually similar consolidated cases
in which police trespassed onto fenced and posted private property looking
for marijuana cultivation and found the illicit crops in wooded areas away
258
from any house.
In the first part of the Oliver opinion, authored by Justice Powell, the
Court appeared to rely on a plain language approach, saying that because
the "explicit language of the Fourth Amendment ... indicates with some
precision the places and things encompassed by its protections, '259 a search
that is not of one of the enumerated four protected areas-houses, persons,
254. One practical way in which the situation was intolerable was the institutional burden
placed on the Court of answering the ever increasing and ever varying questions from the
lower courts about whether a particular investigative action or procedure was a search.
255. Justice O'Connor may be the primary force behind this development. See United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 706-07 (1983) (O'Connor, J.) (subjecting luggage to "sniff test" by
detection canine does not constitute an unreasonable "search" within meaning of fourth
amendment); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("all
searches.., of the contents of an inmate's cell are reasonable"); Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct.
1149, 1157 (1987) (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (moving stereo in order to record serial numbers
considered reasonable); O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1502 (1987) (O'Connor, J.)
(public employer's search of hospital supervisor's office should be judged by reasonableness
standard).
256. Amsterdam predicted this development as early as 1974, saying that the vagueness of
the legitimate expectation of privacy definition of search would lead the Court to reemphasize
simple factors such as whether the police officer was located in a public place and whether
technological aids were used. See Amsterdam, supra note 10, at 403-04.
257. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
258. See id. at 173.
259. Id. at 176.
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papers, and effects-is beyond the scope of the amendment. The only areas
the officers moved through were "open fields, '260 which could neither be
considered houses nor effects. Justice Powell was willing to expand the
fourth amendment meaning of "house" slightly to include the curtilage,
what common sense speakers would call the yard. 26 1 His semantic justification for this interpretation of "houses" in the text appeared to be that the
house and the curtilage shared an important semantic feature; both were
[lived in] places. This semantic feature was of constitutional significance
because it entails the connotation of being a sacred place, 262 which, we
recall, connected the textual "right to be secure in houses" to the historical
origins of 3the amendment in the colonists' protests against writs of
26
assistance.
Justice Powell could have ended the Oliver opinion with this search of
interpretation because the areas searched were neither houses nor curtilage. However, recognizing that Katz had expanded fourth amendment
protections beyond mere searches of, he went on to invoke the legitimacy
rule.264 Without the narrowing effect of the legitimacy rule, from the
standpoint of Katz, the police conduct in Oliver could have violated the
fourth amendment even if it had not involved entry into a protected area:
"[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an areaaccessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected." 265 Justice Powell was not interested, however, in whether the defendants sought to keep their marijuana
cultivation secret, even if that expectation was objectively reasonable.
Instead, he invoked the legitimacy rule to turn Katz on its head: "the test of
legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly
'private' activity. Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the
Fourth Amendment."266 For Justice Powell, an expectation of privacy could
be legitimate only if it related to activities taking place in an area protected
against searches of under the fourth amendment.
Oliver presents a striking example of the confusion and overbreadth
caused by the vagueness of the legitimacy rule combined with the mingling
of different semantic approaches. Once again the Court generically characterized a type of governmental action-apparently any kind of entry onto
private property short of crossing the invisible line of the curtilage-as "not
260. "Open fields" was used by Justice Powell as a specialized legal term rather than with a

common sense meaning. "An open field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are

used in common speech. For example... a thickly wooded area nonetheless may be an open
field as that term is used in construing the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 180 n.11.
261. See id. at 180.
262. Powell argued that "only the curtilage ... warrants the Fourth Amendment protections
that attach to the home. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate
activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' " Id. at 180
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see supra text accompanying note 97.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 64-74.
264. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177. Justice White thought that at this pointJustice Powell went too
far. "There is no need to go further and deal with the expectation of privacy [under Katz].
However reasonable a landowner's expectation of privacy may be, those expectations cannot
convert a field into a "house" or "effect."Id. at 184 (White, J., concurring).
265. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (emphasis added).
266. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83.
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a search," with the result that the fourth amendment apparently cannot
protect any information discovered through such action, regardless of its
secrecy. The distinction between searches of and searching out was blurred
entirely. The implications of the Oliver decision for permitting the government to search out secrets as long as protected areas were not physically
entered became apparent in the next three years when the Court turned to
a new variation on the just listening problem: other forms of perception
that did not involve [movement through an area].

B. Just Tracking
The year before Oliver was decided the Court first encountered the
fourth amendment problem created by the growing use of "beepers,"
primarily in the war against drug trafficking. A beeper is a radio transmitter, typically planted in a container of illegal drugs or chemicals that can be
used to manufacture such drugs, that emits periodic signals enabling a
monitoring radio receiver to track its movements with fair accuracy. In
United States v. Knotts267 all nine Justices agreed that under the particular
facts of that case, 'just tracking" did not constitute a search. 268 The
common ground of agreement appeared to be the search out interpretation: the tracking searched out no secrets because it only revealed the
movements of an automobile on public highways. 269 As the Court itself
characterized Knotts a year later, the tracking of the beeper signals "revealed
that could not have been obtained through visual
no information
270
surveillance."

267. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
268. See id. at 285-88.
269. See id. at 285.
270. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984). However, as LaFave has pointed out,
the beeper monitoring in Knotts did disclose information that could not have been obtained
through visual surveillance because only an "army of bystanders" posted along the entire route
could have connected each sighting of the car with the presence of the drum in the car's trunk
and thereby traced the drum to its ultimate destination. W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.7(d),
at 523. The efforts of Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, to bring in the concept of
protected areas may have distracted the Knotts Court from conducting a careful search out
analysis. The Court previously had held that the fourth amendment provided only diminished
protection against searches of an automobile because "its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects." Caldwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist cited these cases
as evidence that a "person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." Knotts, 460
U.S. at 281. Yet, the policy justifications for allowing warrantless searches of cars stopped on
the highway have very little to do with searching out the secret destination of a driver.
Nonetheless, as would be the case in Oliver, secrecy of information lost fourth amendment
protection because the area connected with the information was not fully protected against
searches of. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
Justice Rehnquist carried his interest in protected areas even further when he indicated that
the location of the drum once unloaded from the automobile remained unprotected from
government searching because the drum was found outside the cabin "in the 'open fields.'"
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. This deliberate foreshadowing of Oliver caused Justice Blackmun,
joined by justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, to refrain from joining Justice Rehnquist's
opinion and only concur in the judgment. See id. at 287 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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When the Court next encountered the beeper issue a few months after
Oliver, in United States v. Karo,27' it came close to using the search out
interpretation to provide a clear answer but became tangled in strands of
the intrusion interpretation. In Karo the information disclosed by tracking
a beeper concealed in a drum of chemicals was the ultimate location of the
drum-a secret drug processing laboratory.2 72 The defendants clearly had
exhibited an expectation that this information would remain secret by
taking the drum through a labyrinth course that repeatedly removed the
drum from public view for unpredictable and occasionally extended
periods.273 They deliberately chose hiding places that were not publicly
connected with them and, hence, would not be under surveillance.2 74 Their
repeated success at evading surveillance established the reasonableness of
their expectation. The Court, however, was unable to assemble a majority
around any of the three opinions it issued because of the confusion that
reliance on the intrusion interpretation caused. Indeed, the cacophony that
these clashing opinions caused may mark Karo as the crescendo of contemporary fourth amendment incoherence.
All nine Justices agreed that a search occurred at least at some points
during the monitoring process. 2 75 They could not agree, however, on which
events constituted searches and whose rights those searches violated. The
hand of the intrusion interpretation was at work in all three Karo opinions,
although passages of search out analysis can be found throughout once the
imagery of intrusion is stripped away. The temptation to use intrusion
analysis was so strong because, after all, something did intrude into both the
drum and the various places the drum was stored: the government's
beeper. This intrusion, however, cannot be described as a search of:
(?) The beeper searched the house.
(?) The agent searched the home with the beeper.
As in the Silverman just listening case, the Court used the intrusion
interpretation to describe an action as a search merely because it contained
one of the semantic features of search of. [movement through an area].
Although the beeper moved into or intruded into the drum and subsequently accompanied the drum into various homes and storage locations,
the beeper could not be described as searching those areas.
Justice White used the intrusion interpretation to argue that the use of
the beeper was simply "a search of a house,"276 emphasizing that "private
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free
of governmental intrusion."277 Beeper monitoring searched each house
because it revealed "a critical fact about the interior of the premises,"
278
namely, that the drum was within the house.
271. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).

272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 708-10.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 719; id. at 728 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment); id. at 734-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

276. Id. at 718.
277. Id. at 714 (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 715.
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Justice O'Connor's concurrence at first seemed to identify the object of
the search as a piece of information-the location of the drum-rather than
a place.2 79 Indeed, at one point she used the exact language of the search
out interpretation to describe why some defendants might have no fourth
amendment claim: "It is simply not his secret that the beeper is
disclosing. '28 0 She too, however, became mired in the intrusion interpredescribing the beeper monitoring as if it were a search
tation by repeatedly
2 81
of the drum.
Justice O'Connor thus equated a defendant's right to prevent searches
of his container with the right to prevent searching out a secret by tracking
the movements of the container.2 82 This equation, based on the intrusion
interpretation, obscures an underlying insight relevant to the search out
interpretation. If one assumes that the object of searching out was the
presumably secret location of the drum, Justice O'Connor is probably right
that a person who had no control over the drum could not reasonably claim
that its location was his secret. But the search out analysis changes if the
secret disclosed by searching is the location of the laboratory, rather than
the location of the drum per se. Then, as in the just seeing cases discussed
below, 283 the source of the perception (the beeper) would not be the secret,
but only a clue to the secret. If the location of the laboratory was a secret,
it was surely a secret belonging to the owner of the laboratory even if that
person neither owned nor controlled the drum prior to delivery.
Justice Stevens employed his own version of the intrusion interpretation to formulate a much broader view of how the use of the beeper
constituted a search. Although the government clearly was not discovering
any secret information when it was not monitoring the beeper, Justice
Stevens insisted that the beeper's mere presence in a defendant's home
constituted a search:
I find little comfort in the Court's notion that no invasion of
privacy occurs until a listener obtains some significant information by use of the device. . . .[The expectation of privacy] is
279. Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
280. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
281. Indeed, she became so enamored of the intrusion interpretation that she suggested
that Katz also be understood as a case involving the search of a "container":
[tiwo people who speak face to face in a private place or on a private telephone line
both may share an expectation that the conversation will remain private, [as Katz
held] ....One might say that the telephone line, or simply the space that separates
two persons in conversation, is their jointly owned "container." Each has standing to
challenge the use as evidence of the fruits of an unauthorized search of that
"container...."
Id. at 726 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted). Justice O'Connor seemed to have come full circle back to justice Butler's unsuccessful suggestion in Olmstead that wiretapping be viewed as a search of the telephone wire. See
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 487 (1928) (Butler,J., dissenting).
282. Justice O'Connor reasoned, "A defendant should be allowed to challenge evidence
obtained by monitoring a beeper installed in a closed container only if... the defendant had
an interest in the container itself sufficient to empower him to give effective consent to a
search of the container." Karo, 468 U.S. at 727 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
283. See infra text accompanying notes 287-346.
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compromised the moment the invasion occurs. A bathtub is a less
private area when the plumber is present even if his back is
28 4
turned.
Justice Stevens noted that "[p]resumably the Court would also conclude
that no privacy interest would be infringed by the entrance of a blindfolded
28 5
plumber."
His example shows how different intrusion can be from searching. If
the plumber blunders into my bathroom while I am lathered up in the tub,
perhaps I would say that my bathroom, and my privacy, have been invaded.
But surely I would not say that the plumber searched the bathroom,
particularly if he were blindfolded. The key semantic component [purpose
to find] would be missing and [movement through an area], even a very
private area, is not sufficient to make an action a search. The intrusion of
an unmonitored beeper would be no more a common sense search than the
28 6
intrusion of a nail into the wall would have been in Silverman.
C. just Seeing
1.

The Problem of Describing Seeing as Searching

The challenge of describing the act of seeing as a search is similar to
the problem presented by listening, but is even more subtle. If the action is
described just as "seeing," that description cannot be converted into an
expression using search of. "The detective saw the house" cannot entail
"the detective searched the house" because see does not contain the
features [movement through an area] and <X is affected object>. However, expressions which use the near-synonym, "looking," can sometimes be
converted into search of statements:
The detective looked over the outside of the briefcase, trying to
find fingerprints.
The detective searched the outside of the briefcase for fingerprints.
This conversion is made possible by the metaphoric implication of movement created when look is combined with over. Even if both subject and
object remain stationary, we metaphorically imagine the focus of vision, like
the beam of a spotlight, moving over the exterior surface of the briefcase.2 87
284. Karo, 468 U.S. at 735 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis

added).
285, Id. at 735 n.10 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
286. See supra text following note 134. Despite the dissonance among the Karo opinions
caused by the varying mixtures of the intrusion and search out interpretations, the nine
Justices unanimously avoided relying on the policy interpretation. No one argued that it was
illegitimate to expect that movements of chemicals to manufacture cocaine, or the location of
a cocaine laboratory, should be secret from the government. Justice White said concisely:
"Those suspected of drug offenses are no less entitled to [fourth amendment] protection than
those suspected of nondrug offenses." Karo, 468 U.S. at 717.
287, An expression using "look through" can be converted to a search of statement only if
it likewise evokes the metaphor of a glance moving through an area. Compare the following
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This metaphoric assumption permits the attribution of the following
semantic features to both look over and search in the two expressions
above: [movement through an area], [purpose to find Y], [activity],
[achievement], 288 and <X has surface>. However, it is less clear that the
feature <X is affected object> can be attributed to look over, because it
does not seem that the briefcase has been affected, unless in looking the
detective also generated actual movement, for example by turning the
briefcase over in his hands. Because search in the fourth amendment
context does require that the government's action somehow affect the
object of the search, we might expect a court to be reluctant to treat 'just
seeing" as a search under the search of interpretation unless the action9
28
could be described as looking over accompanied by actual movement.
This expectation is fulfilled90 in the recent Supreme Court decision of Arizona
2
v. Hicks discussed below.
Application of the search out interpretation is also different in cases of
seeing as contrasted to listening. The factors that cause things to be hidden
from sight are more variable and subtle than the factors that prevent
listening. People are usually consciously aware of whether others can hear
their conversations, and act accordingly. 29 ' Thus, if one's conversation was
so difficult to hear that a third party who overheard it searched it out, the
speaker almost certainly expected the conversation to be secret. Further,
overhearing a conversation inevitably results in the disclosure of some
information, thereby at least creating the possibility that searching out a
conversation will disclose secrets.
On the other hand, people are usually less conscious and certain of
what others can see. At present, the government cannot search out secrets
by seeing through opaque barriers, even when its sight is technologically
aided. Therefore, issues of searching by seeing typically arise when the
government sees despite darkness or distance. Although people can rely
with confidence on opaque barriers to protect them from the sight of
others, they are less sure about darkness and distance. While the range of
hearing for audible speech drops off sharply over a short distance, the
two pairs of expressions:
(1) The detective looked through the diary. The detective searched the diary.
(2) The detective looked through the window. (?) The detective searched the window.
"Search the window" might make sense if the detective looked over the surface of the window
(e.g., for fingerprints), but not if the detective merely saw through the window.
288. Look over meets the test of both temporal prepositional phrases required for the
features [activity] and [achievement]:
The detective looked over the outside of the briefcase for two minutes.
The detective looked over the outside of the briefcase in two minutes.
For further discussion of these features, see supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
289. The example used in the preceding note-"The detective looked through the diary"could easily be treated as a fourth amendment search under the search of interpretation
because the looking would be accompanied by physically turning the pages of the diary. For
a discussion of the importafice of "rummaging" to the search of interpretation, see supra text
accompanying notes 71, 94.
290. See infra text accompanying notes 347-60.
291. Katz dosed the door to the telephone booth. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352
(1967). Silverman chose to speak inside the four walls of his office. Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961). If we have no physical barriers to protect us, we place distance
between ourselves and unwanted auditors or lower our voices with an eye to the existing
distance.
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range of effective sight can be considerable and unpredictable. Because
people are less certain about the protections afforded by darkness and
distance to begin with, they are less likely to rely only on them to protect a
secret.

292

Further, seeing covers a wide range of objects, many of which have
limited informational content, unlike listening, which typically focuses on
communication. Therefore, in converting expressions about seeing into
statements using "searching out," we often will need to change the direct
93
2
object from that which was seen to information disclosed by the seeing.

292. In two cases, United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730 (1983) (plurality opinion), the Court has held, in passing, that illumination of something
previously hidden by darkness was not a search. In Lee a Coast Guard patrol boat pulled
alongside a motorboat at night and shone a searchlight, illuminating bootleg liquor on deck.
Lee, 274 U.S. at 560-61. In Brown a police officer, after lawfully stopping a car at night, shined
a flashlight into the interior and saw in an open glove compartment plastic vials, loose white
powder, and balloons, giving probable cause to conduct a further search and seizure of
narcotics. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 733-34 (plurality opinion). Under the search out interpretation it seems unlikely that the government searched out secrets in either case by using
illuminationto see. Neither Lee nor Brown seemed to have been relying on darkness to protect
their secrets. Lee relied on the isolation of the open seas; Brown on the seclusion of a car
interior. The government lawfully defeated those expectations. (Well-established warrant
exceptions allowed the investigatory stop on the high seas in Lee and the driver check point
stop in Brown.) The Court has not yet considered a claim that the government violated privacy
expectations deliberately based on darkness.
Although lower court decisions are split on this issue, those decisions that hold that a search
occurred can be explained as instances in which the person claiming fourth amendment
protection reasonably expected that what was seen would not be illuminated because it was
located within an area over which he controlled the light. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams,
494 Pa. 496, 499-500, 431 A.2d 964, 966 (1981) (police used infra-red sensitive optical device
to view activities at night in a darkened apartment). The preference of commentators such as
LaFave for the dissenting opinion in United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
which contended that peering through a half inch slit between two garage doors with a
flashlight was a search can also be explained by search out analysis. See id. at 1367 (Wright, J.,
dissenting); W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.2(b), at 333-36. It was reasonable for Wright to
expect the contents of his garage to remain secret despite the slight opening between the doors
because the opening could not, under normal circumstances, admit enough light to illuminate
the garage interior. The fact that people can expect darkness only in interior spaces under
their control also may create a temptation to use the intrusion interpretation by imagining the
glance as penetration into a protected area: e.g., "the detective looked into the darkened
apartment."
293. The modifications to the search of, intrusion, and search out interpretations caused by
the semantic features of "seeing" are apparent in what LaFave calls the "exceedingly difficult"
issue of whether techniques using ultraviolet sensitive tracing powder constitute searches. See
W. LAFAvw, supra note 137, § 2.2(d), at 352. In the typical case a suspect has handled
contraband or stolen money that had been treated with a powder or grease that glows under
ultraviolet light, but is not otherwise noticeable. While questioning the suspect, the police
shine an ultraviolet light on his hands causing a fluorescent glow, usually under fingernails or
in creases where the powder has remained. The lower courts are divided on whether the use
of the ultraviolet light isa search. For a discussion of the lower court cases, see W. LAFAVE, supra
note 137, § 2.2(d), at 350-55. The Supreme Court recently passed up the opportunity to
address the issue by denying certiorari from a 4-3 decision of the Colorado Supreme Court
holding that use of the light was a search. People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1986),
cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 468 (1986). Search out analysis would indicate that a search takes place
if the illumination reveals information a suspect objectively considers to be secret, such as the
fact that he handled stolen money. Under this interpretation, neither the suspect's hands nor
even the powder itself are the relevant objects of the searching. Indeed, the suspect does not
even know the powder is present so the powder itself could hardly be his secret. Rather, the
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The Court has confronted most directly the problem of just seeing in
two cases in which the seeing took place from an aerial perspective:
Californiav. Ciraolo29 4 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.295 Although the
Court wrote separate opinions, both cases were argued and decided at the
same time. In each case Chief Justice Burger, writing for a majority of five,
held that no search occurred, 296 while Justice Powell authored a vigorous
297
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
The opinions in both cases exhibit a confused mixture of interpretations.
2.

California v. Ciraolo

In Ciraolo, the simpler of the two cases, two police officers flew a
fixed-wing aircraft at an altitude of 1000 feet over the defendant's home to
verify an anonymous tip that he was cultivating marijuana in his
backyard. 298 The officers took to the skies because a ten-foot-high fence
around the backyard blocked their sight from ground level.2 99 From their
aerial vantage point the officers saw with their naked eyes a fifteen by
twenty-five foot garden plot and "readily identified marijuana plants eight
feet to ten feet in height."3 00 Clearly adopting the intrusion interpretation,
the California Court of Appeals held that the police officers had conducted
a search because their action was "a direct and unauthorized intrusion into
the sanctity of the home."3 01
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the lower court's intrusion
interpretation by emphasizing that the police action consisted of simple
visual "observations from a public vantage point" that were "physically
non-intrusive."30 2 The dissent, on the other hand, embraced the lower
court's view that seeing is an intrusion, insisting that the Court was
sanctioning "warrantless intrusions into the home. 30 3 The intrusion interpretation thus functioned as an unfortunate red herring for the Court,
obscuring the more meaningful grounds of disagreement between the
majority and dissenters.
Justice Powell's reliance on the intrusion interpretation led him into an
incoherent description of the challenged police action:
(?) [The police officers] use[d] an airplane ... to intrude visually
30 4
into respondent's yard.

object of sight, aided by ultraviolet illumination, is only a clue to the true object of the
searching out, the suspect's secret contact with the stolen money.
294. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
295. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
296. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-15; Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239.
297. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215-26 (Powell, J., dissenting); Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at
240-52 (Powell, J., dissenting).
298. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209-10.
299. Id. at 209.
300. Id.
301. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (1984).
302. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
303. Id. at 226 (Powell, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 222 (Powell, J., dissenting). The full sentence is: "The Court concludes,
nevertheless, that [the officer] could use an airplane-a product of modem technology-to
intrude visually into respondent's yard." Id.
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It seems that Justice Powell insisted on using the intrusion interpretation,
despite the semantic incoherence it caused, because it gave him the
opportunity to exploit an ambiguity in "intrusive." "Intrusive" can mean
30 5
and "impertinent or offensive." 306
both "forcing or projecting inward"
The officer's aerial observation could have been intrusive only in the latter
sense, as illustrated by the following coherent use of "intrusive" from
Justice Powell's dissent: "Aerial surveillance is nearly as intrusive on family
30 7
privacy as physical trespass into the curtilage."
Thus, when Justice Powell said the police intruded into the privacy of
the defendant's home, he really was asserting that their actions intruded
onto, or offended, "personal interests in privacy and liberty recognized by a
free society,"308 rather than intruded into, or searched, a home. The effect
of this ambiguous use of "intrusive" was to clothe with the disguise of the
intrusion interpretation an argument essentially based on the policy
interpretation.3 09 But Justice Powell himself was beguiled by that disguise.
Rather than mount a reasoned policy argument for regulating aerial
observation under the fourth amendment, Justice Powell simply assumed
his conclusion by labelling aerial observation of a curtilage as intrusive.
When Chief Justice Burger chose to take him literally and pointed out that
there was no intrusion (that would be a different case),3 10 the conversation
between the majority and dissent broke down and the policy differences
between the two positions never were articulated or defended.
Behind the abortive intrusion and policy interpretations undertaken
in Ciraolo were arguments on both sides that employed search out analysis.
The Chief Justice stated at the outset that the case turned on whether the
defendant reasonably expected privacy "in the object of the challenged
search."3'1 He then said that Ciraolo was claiming privacy "as to his
unlawful agricultural pursuits. 31 2 In other words, Ciraolo's fourth amendment claim was that the police discovered a secret fact: that he was growing
marijuana in his backyard. Under the search out interpretation, the validity
of this claim is tested, not by consideration of the means used by the police
to discover this fact, but by whether the fact was objectively secret prior to
the police discovery. Accordingly, from the standpoint of the search out
interpretation, the heart of the majority opinion was this statement: "Any
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have
305.

WEBsTER'S NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1187 (1976).

306. Id. Compare "Surgery is an intrusive medical procedure" with "That surgeon is an
intrusive fellow."
307. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 225 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 220 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
309. Justice Powell's semantic strategy also is revealed by his choice of words in the
following two different restatements of the legitimacy rule: "if police surveillance has intruded
on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy," id. at 218 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added); "whether the surveillance in question had invaded a constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy," id. (Powell, J.. dissenting) (emphasis added). The
more usual formulation uses the verb "infringe," see, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 U.S. 1492,
1497 (1987), which does not so vividly suggest an alternate sense connoting physical entry.
310. Ciraolo, 476 U.S at 214.
311. Id. at 211.
312. Id.
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seen everything that these officers observed."3 13 Likewise, the heart of the
dissent was Justice Powell's denial of the above statement:
[T]he actual risk to privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft
is virtually non-existent. Travelers on commercial flights, as well
as private planes used for business or personal reasons, normally
obtain at most a fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating
glimpse of the landscape and buildings over which they pass. The
risk that a passenger on such a plane might observe private
activities, and might connect those activities with particularpeople, is
314
simply too trivial to protect against.
Justice Powell identified the direct object of the claimed searching out
with greater precision than did the Chief Justice. What the police saw was
a large garden plot; what they searched out was specific information, that a
particular person, Ciraolo, at a particular location was growing a particular
kind of plant, marijuana. Justice Powell plausibly argued that the "member
of the public" flying over the backyard would not have discovered this
complex of facts.3 15 The aerial observer that a reasonable person might
expect would not gaze at any backyard long enough to identify the type of
plants, or to connect the yard with a particular street address.3 1 6 Without
these particular pieces of information, Ciraolo's secret remained safe. The
police were unexpected observers not only because their aerial vantage
point defeated Ciraolo's ground level attempts to protect his garden from
observation, but also because they observed with unusual intensity and were
armed with important foreknowledge: the address of the location observed
317
and the identifying features of marijuana viewed from the air.
313. Id. at 213-14.
314. Id. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
315. Unfortunately, this telling point was deflected when Justice Powell concluded his
paragraph by writing as if the issue were whether defendant had exposed his yard to the public
instead of his claimed secret. Id. Thus, Justice Powell's preoccupation with the intrusion
interpretation obscured his sound semantic insights under the search out interpretation.
316. This distinction is similar to the point made in the discussion of Miller and Smith, see
supra text accompanying notes 232, 249. LaFave has developed this concept of secrecy through
anonymity with some care. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.7, at 499-538; LaFave, The
Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARz. L. R~v. 291,
295-304 (1986).
317. Clarifying the object of searching out illuminates an otherwise puzzling part of the
lower court's opinion in Ciraolo. The California court said it was "significant that the aerial
surveillance of his backyard was not the result of a routine patrol conducted for any other
legitimate law enforcement or public safety objective, but was undertaken for the specific
purpose of observing this particular enclosure within defendant's curtilage." Ciraolo, 161 Cal.
App. 3d 1081, 1089, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 97 (1984). The ChiefJustice found this "novel analysis"
both irrelevant and inexplicable. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214 n.2. Of course, from a semantic
perspective, a "casual, accidental observation," id. at 212, would not be a search in any of the
three senses because it would lack the component [purpose to find]. A purpose to find,
however, is only a necessary, not sufficient condition for either search of or search out.
Therefore, the Chief Justice was correct that the mere fact that the police observation was
made with the purpose of finding marijuana was not sufficient to make the observation a
search.
The lower court's point, however, has relevance for search out analysis. If Justice Powell is
correct, a casual aerial observer would not discover Ciraolo's secret because he would not give
that particular yard the requisite attention, nor would he be forearmed with the necessary
knowledge. On the other hand, if while making a routine traffic patrol by air the police
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Dow Chemical Co. v. United States

The Dow Chemical Co.318 case had its origins in an Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) investigation of emissions from two coal-burning

power houses located within the 2000 acre Dow Chemical Company plant
in Midland, Michigan.3 1 9 Dow had voluntarily permitted the EPA to make
an on-site inspection of the power houses and supplied schematic
drawings. 320 Dow refused a second inspection request, however, when it
learned that the EPA inspectors planned to take photographs of the
32
plant. '

Following the refusal, the EPA did not seek an administrative search
warrant under the Clean Air Act,3 22 but instead employed a private aerial
survey company to take high resolution aerial photographs of the entire
plant.3 23 The contractor took approximately seventy-five high resolution
photographs using a sophisticated, floor mounted aerial mapping camera.
The airplane made at least six passes at altitudes of 12,000, 3,000, and
1,200 feet, staying within navigable air space.3 24 Dow sought to recover the
prints and negatives obtained through this photography and enjoin any
future warrantless aerial photography by the EPA as violative of the fourth
amendment.3 25 The Court held that no search had taken place even though
discovered that Ciraolo was growing marijuana, that very discovery would tend to contradict
Justice Powell's assumption and would suggest that Ciraolo's expectation of secrecy was
objectively unreasonable.
This discussion points out a potential flaw in Justice Powell's dissent. The risk that a
reasonable person in Ciraolo's position should have considered was discovery by the police.
LaFave's analysis of the aerial surveillance cases also fails to make this distinction, as he would
use a "curious passerby" standard. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.7, at 499-538; LaFave,
supra note 316, at 299; see also Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance:
Curtainsfor Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 725, 746-59 (1985) (pre-Ciraoloanalysis using same
test). A police officer on routine traffic patrol, unlike the commercial traveler imagined by
Justice Powell, is expected to be alert to evidence of crime in the passing scene below, see
People v. Superior Court (Stroud), 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765 (1974),
can pinpoint sites seen from the air to street level locations, and may well be routinely trained
in marUuana identification. Therefore, under a careful application of the search out
interpretation, a remand might have been needed to supplement the record as to the
frequency and nature of law enforcement overflights in Ciraolo's neighborhood. Cf United
States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1290 (9th Cir. 1980) (aerial observation was not search in part
because defendant's ranch, although located in secluded coastal region, routinely was
overflown by Coast Guard helicopters for both training and law enforcement purposes).
318. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
319. Id. at 229.
320. Id.
321. Id. This refusal apparently was based on a long-standing company policy prohibiting
the use of camera equipment by anyone other than authorized Dow personnel and subjecting
the release of any photographs of the facility to prior management review and approval. Id. at
241 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
322. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413-7414 (1983). Administrative inspections are authorized in section
114 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414. If entry is refused, the EPA can enlist the assistance of the
local U.S. attorney in seeking a warrant from the appropriate district court. See Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1362 n.14 (E.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd, 749 F.2d 307 (6th
Cir. 1984), reversalaf'd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
323. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 229.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 230.
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just seeing was aided by high resolution photography
that preserved
3 26
detailed images for later study and enlargement.
Tacked on to the end of the majority opinion in Ciraolo is a footnote
that specifically referred to the Court's'concurrent decision in Dow Chemical
Co. and then suggested that" '[a]erial observation of curtilage may become
invasive.., through modern technology which discloses to the senses those
intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police
or fellow citizens.' ",327 LaFave interprets this footnote as suggesting that
had the police in Ciraolo used the EPA's camera, the Court would have
found that action to be a search. 328 This interpretation assumes that the only
reason the aerial photography in Dow Chemical Co. was not a search was
because the area photographed was not a home or its curtilage. Admittedly,
this interpretation finds support in a Dow Chemical Co. footnote: "We find
it important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home,
where privacy expectations are most heightened." 329
The flaw in this interpretation is that the Court not only held that the
area photographed in Dow Chemical Co. was not curtilage, but also concluded that the high resolution photography did not constitute use of
"'modern technology which discloses to the senses otherwise imperceptible
intimate associations, objects or activities ... ",,330 Although the photographs showed greater detail than naked-eye views, the Chief Justice
emphasized that the images were "limited to an outline of the facility's
buildings and equipment. . . . [No] identifiable human faces or secret
documents [were] captured in such a fashion as to implicate more serious
'33
privacy concerns." '
In the Court's view, the more detailed vision made possible by the high
resolution photographs did not significantly increase the information
revealed to the aerial observer. Like Ciraolo's ten foot high marijuana
plants, the outline of Dow's buildings and equipment was plainly visible to
the naked-eye observation of expected aerial observers. 332 On the other
hand, the Court implied that if photographic techniques had enabled the
EPA to identify faces or read the text of documents located 1000 feet below
navigable airspace, fourth amendment concerns would have been implicated because Dow reasonably could expect such details to be " 'otherwise
imperceptible to police or fellow citizens,' "333 that is, secret.
326. Id. at 238-39.
327. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S 207, 215 n.3 (1986). This suggestion was made by
quoting, with apparent approval, the cited language from the state's brief in Ciraolo.
328. W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.2(c), at 346-47.
329. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 237 n.4.
330. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, 14-15). The photographs
were "not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns." Dow Chemical Co.,
476 U.S. at 238.
331. Id. at 238, 238- 9 n.5 (emphasis added).
332. To illustrate the visual magnification made possible by the high resolution photography, Dow pointed out that power lines as small as one-half-inch in diameter could be seen in
the photographs. Id. at 243. The majority opinion dismissed this point by characterizing this
detail as a mere "outline" observable only because of the contrast between the lines and a stark
white background. Id. at 238 n.5.
333. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14-15).
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The majority discussion of whether the plant area was more like open
fields than curtilage, therefore, was largely irrelevant from the standpoint
of the search out interpretation and was due to the confusion caused by
Oliver. The curtilage doctrine should function solely to extend the fourth
amendment's prohibition against searches of homes to the yard area
surrounding the home. As demonstrated by Ciraolo, the curtilage doctrine
does not say that objects or activities located in a backyard are secret per se
and thus protected against searching out. If Ciraolo's marijuana patch was
located in an unfenced lot fully visible from the street, the police would still
be required to comply with the fourth amendment before conducting a
search of the yard by entering it. Yet,just seeing marijuana plants would not
be a searching out if they were visible from the street, even if they were
located in the curtilage, or for that matter in the house on a window sill. Just
as the curtilage doctrine cannot automatically make things located within a
yard secret, neither should the doctrine take away the reasonableness of
one's expectation that some things located outside the environs of a home
are secret.
It thus appears that the Court's decision in Dow Chemical Co. rested on
the search out interpretation despite misleading references to the nature of
the area observed. If so, the stated holding of Dow Chemical Co. is
dangerously overbroad: "We hold that the taking of aerial photographs of
an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 33 4 This holding is inconsistent with
the Court's strong suggestion that taking aerial photographs of an industrial plant from navigable airspace would be a search if it revealed the text
of a secret document. 33 5 Neither the location of the camera (in navigable air
space) nor the location of the document (within an industrial plant
complex) would then exempt such a search from fourth amendment
regulation.
The dissent, like the majority, mingled together the intrusion and
search out interpretations. Justice Powell plausibly pointed out that business premises like the Dow plant are as fully protected against searches of as
are private homes, even though a 2000 acre chemical plant is obviously not
like a backyard.3 36 The Chief Justice rejoined by agreeing that business
premises enjoy some fourth amendment protection, but pointed out there
was no search of the plant. He said: "The narrow issue raised by Dow's claim
of search and seizure, however, concern[ed] aerial observation ... without

physical entry."33 7 Justice Powell then treated this distinguishing of cases
involving physical entries of business places as a repudiation of Katz and
accused the majority of holding that the fourth amendment only protected
Dow against actual physical entry into an enclosed area.3 38 Having branded
334. Dow Chemical Co., 427 U.S. at 239.
335. See id. at 238-39.
336. Id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 237. Unfortunately, the ChiefJustice could not resist dropping a footnote at this
point saying it was important that the plant was "not an area immediately adjacent to a private
home," id. at 237 n.4, thus suggesting a misplaced reliance on the curtilage distinction and
playing back into Justice Powell's argument.
338. Id. at 246-48 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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the majority as retrograde adherers to the Olmstead search of interpretation,
Justice Powell further muddied the waters by saying that the
"EPA's aerial
3 39
photography penetrated into a private commercial enclave."
As in Ciraolo, once the intrusion interpretation, with its baggage of
curtilage and open fields doctrine, is culled out of the majority and
dissenting opinions, one can see that Justice Powell engaged in a more
subtle search out analysis than did the Chief Justice. In at least part of the
dissent, Justice Powell applied the search out interpretation with clarity:
As long as Dow takes reasonable steps to protect its secrets, the law
should enforce its right against theft or disclosure of those secrets.
.. .Dow has taken every feasible step to protect information
claimed to constitute trade secrets from the public .... [T]he aerial
photography captured information that Dow had taken reason3 40
able steps to preserve as private.
When one identifies trade secrets as the object of the claimed searching out, the reason why a particularly subtle searching out analysis was
required in Dow Chemical Co. becomes evident. Although the plant as an
area was not the object of the challenged search, the details of Dow's plant
and equipment disclosed in the photographs were, in the company's view,
34
a critical clue to the secrets of its proprietary manufacturing processes. '
As pointed out by Justice Powell, the photographic technique used by the
aerial photographer not only recorded minute details, but also permitted
"stereoscopic examination, a type of examination that permits depth
perception."3 42 Therefore, Dow plausibly could claim that the EPA photographs were "the functional equivalent of technical process drawings and

339. Id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
340. Id. at 248-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). The second elision marks the omission of a
sentence in which Justice Powell momentarily slipped back into the intrusion interpretation:
"Accordingly, Dow has a reasonable expectation of privacy in its commercialfacility in the sense
required by the Fourth Amendment." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, the
semantic confusion caused by mingling interpretations led Justice Powell to describe the object
of the search as information, then an area, and again as information, within three consecutive
sentences.
341. According to one of Dow's employees:
[Firom aeriar photographs enlarged to the scale of one (1) inch to about fifty (50) feet
or less the size of motors and drives, types of control instrument employed, position
and type of agitation used in reactors, and like detailed information concerning
process equipment would be revealed; ... given such information ... a competent
chemical engineer, using basic engineering calculations, could determine with
reasonable accuracy the type of styrene resin process being employed, the solids levels
and viscosity levels of the materials being handled, the overall through-put rate and
manufacturing costs which information would be particularly valuable to a competitor of The Dow Chemical Company ....
Joint Appendix at A-66 to A-67, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (No.
84-1259) (affidavit of Robert R. Bumb, Production Manager of Dow's Styrene Plastics
Department). While this affidavit speaks in terms of enlargement to a scale of I inch to 50feet,
the EPA photographs were of such high resolution that enlargement to a scale of 1 inch to 20
feet or greater was possible without significant loss of detail. See Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at
243 (Powell, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 242 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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blueprints revealing the details of Dow technology...-the very heart of
3 43
Dow's business."
The majority opinion consistently sought to describe the EPA action as
"observation" and thus was misled into equating the common sense object
of seeing-the plant viewed at a glance-and the object of the claimed
searching out-trade secrets revealed by studying the precise sizes, shapes,
and layout of Dow's equipment.3 4 Justice Powell persuasively argued that
these trade secrets are not imperiled by the routine overflights of commercial and passenger airplanes: "it is not the case that '[a]ny member of the
public flying in this airspace who cared to glance down' could have obtained
3' 45
the information captured by the aerial photography of Dow's facility.
Dow reasonably relied not only on the distance of the expected aerial
observer, but also on the brevity of her passing view; such an observer never
could obtain sufficient information about the plant structure to duplicate
Dow's proprietary manufacturing processes. One can best appreciate the
impact of the high-resolution aerial photography by imagining it as the
functional equivalent of stationing an engineer for several days at a drafting
table located 50 feet above the plant (or alternatively at 1000 feet above the
plant-navigable airspace-as long as she is equipped with good
3 46
binoculars).
343. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 39, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986) (No. 84-1259).
344. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238-39.
345. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 249 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986)).
346. As in Ciraolo, see supra text accompanying notes 298-317, however, a thoughtful
application of the search out interpretation to Dow cannot end with the straw man of the
disinterested commercial air traveller. One must further ask whether a reasonable company in
Dow's position could expect the details of an open-air plant to remain secret given that, as
pointed out by the Court, these alleged secrets were in fact captured by "a conventional, albeit
precise, commercial camera commonly used in map-making." Id. at 242 n.4. The Court felt
confident that Dow acted unreasonably by taking "no measure for aerial security," id. at 237 n.4
(quoting Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1984), whereas the
dissent asserted "that Dow had taken reasonable and objective steps to preserve" the secrecy
of its trade secrets from aerial surveillance. Id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Again, this disagreement stems from confusion over the relevant direct object for searching.
If Dow sought to keep its open-air plant, as an entire area, from being seen by an aerial
observer, it obviously failed to take the only available effective steps: covering the plant with
an opaque roof or installing anti-aircraft guns. See LaFave, supra note 316, at 399. If, however,
Dow's goal was to protect its trade secrets, not the view of the plant per se, then it may well
have taken reasonable steps to prevent aerial observers from converting their view (via
photography) into meaningful information about Dow's manufacturing processes. As explained by Justice Powell, Dow had a long-standing security procedure for identifying planes
whose aerial behavior over the plant suggested they were taking photographs. Using a
working relationship with state police and local airports, Dow then could locate the pilot to
determine if he had photographed the plant. If the suspicion proved true, Dow would request
the photographer to turn over the film prior to development so that Dow could make an initial
review to determine if trade secrets were revealed. If secrets were disclosed in the photographs, Dow would keep the photographs and negatives. If the photographer refused to
cooperate, Dow would commence litigation. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 242 n.3 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
The very case decided by the Court was proof of the efficacy of these safeguards. Dow's
monitoring procedure identified the suspicious EPA overflight and within six weeks Dow filed
a lawsuit. The photographs were promptly sealed under a protective order and apparently
remained protected thereafter. SeeJoint Appendix at A-iii, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
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D.

Confusing Intruding with Seeing

During the 1986-87 term the Supreme Court confronted two cases of
claimed searching that involved both seeing and physical intrusion: Arizona
v. Hicks347 and United States v. Dunn.348 In each case the majority focused on
whether a search of a protected area had taken place, to the exclusion of a
possible search out interpretation based on the seeing aspect of the
government's action. In Hicks the majority used the search of interpretation
to justify holding that a search had occurred, at the price of a potentially too
narrow decision based solely on the presence of [movement]. Dunn used
both the search of interpretation and a host of post-Katz decisions to decide
that no search took place, in apparent defiance of both common sense and
the search out interpretation represented by Katz.
In Hicks the police had entered the defendant's apartment in response
to a report that a bullet had been fired through the floor of Hicks's
apartment into the unit below, where it struck and injured someone.3 49
They entered to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons.
One officer became curious upon observing two sets of expensive stereo
equipment in what appeared to be a "squalid and otherwise ill-appointed"
apartment. Suspecting that the equipment was stolen, he picked up a
turntable and read the serial number engraved on the bottom. While still in
the apartment, he called the number into headquarters and was3 50advised
that it matched a turntable reported stolen in an armed robbery.
The central question presented on certiorari was whether the police
were exempted from obtaining a warrant before examining the turntable,
pursuant to the exception permitting the warrantless search and seizure of
contraband or other evidence of a crime when viewed by the police in the
course of an otherwise lawful search.3 5 ' Before deciding whether to grant
an exception to the warrant clause, however, the Court first had to decide
if the actions that led to discovery of the serial number constituted either a
search or a seizure. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia made quick work
of both issues: "the mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute
a seizure. .

.

. [The officer's] moving of the equipment, however, did

constitute a 'search'....s3 5 2 Justice Scalia defended the latter conclusion by
a forthright invocation of semantic common sense: "A search is a
search .... ,,353
476 U.S. 227 (1986) (No. 84-1259) (table of contents refers to "Exhibits 2-5 (under seal)" and
to "Sealed Joint Appendix"). Therefore, only after the Court's adverse decision could one
confidently say that it was unreasonable for Dow to expect to prevent disclosure of its secrets
through post-overflight litigation.
347. 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
348. 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
349. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1151-52.
350. Id. at 1152"
351. Id. at 1152-53. The defendant did not dispute that the initial warrantless entry into the
apartment and the subsequent search for a shooter, victims, and weapons were justified by
both probable cause and exigent circumstances. See id. at 1152.
352. Id. at 1152. The Court then held that this search exceeded the scope of the permissible
prior search of the apartment for weapons and thus required a warrant. Id. at 1153-55.
353. Id. at 1153. The balance of this sentence, omitted here, is discussed at infra notes
359-60.

600
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In dissent, Justice Powell attacked the majority opinion as defining
"search" solely in terms of movement:
[the Court] perceives a constitutional distinction between reading
a serial number on an object and moving or picking up an
identical object to see its serial number .... With all respect, this
distinction between "looking" at a suspicious object in plain view
and "moving" it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth
54
Amendment.
Justice Scalia could have responded to Justice Powell by employing both
search of and search out interpretations. As explained above,3 55 under the
search of interpretation, the distinction between just "looking at" an object
and "moving it even a few inches" is not trivial in semantic terms. The
officer did not merely look at the turntable. He looked over its surface while
turning the turntable in his hands, thus supplying the necessary features
[movement through an area] and <X is affected object> for conversion to
the expression: "The officer searched the turntable." However, in addition
to the search of the turntable, the officer's actions also resulted in searching
out a fact Hicks reasonably believed was secret: that he had possession of
stolen goods. Obviously it was this latter searching out that primarily
concerned Hicks rather than the searching of the turntable per se. This
distinction seemed to have eluded Justice Scalia, who said: "A search is a
search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable." 3-5 6 The search of the turntable would not have also been a
searching out if it disclosed nothing but the bottom.
Justice Scalia's apparent sole reliance on the search of approach
becomes troubling in light of a hypothetical raised in Justice Powell's
dissent. Justice Powell pointed out that the officer would have been able to
read the serial numbers of some of the other equipment (which later also
proved to be stolen) without touching or moving that equipment, although
he would have had to squeeze into a foot-wide space between the back of
the equipment and the wall to do so.357 Justice Scalia had a potential
rejoinder to Justice Powell when he said that "taking action . . .which
exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents...
produce[d] a new invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the
exigent circumstance[s] that validated the entry." 358 If one reads "taking
action" broadly, then snooping between the stereo and the wall, as Justice
Powell hypothesized, would have been at least a searching out, even if the
officer 'Just saw" the back of the stereo, because it had been concealed
during his prior lawful search of the apartment for people and weapons.
But Justice Scalia's choice of words when concluding that a search occurred-"Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment . . . did constitute a
354. Hicks, 107 S.Ct. at 1156-57 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissent seemed to
suggest that the Court was returning to the dismal days of Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961), when fourth amendment protections depended literally upon "inches." See id. at
512; supra text accompanying note 134.
355. See supra text accompanying notes 289-90.
356. Hicks, 107 S.Ct. at 1153.
357. Id. at 1156 & n.3.
358. Id. at 1152.
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'search' " 359 -combined with his epigram-"[a] search is a search" 3 6 0raises some doubt about whether he would have found that seeing the
number without moving the object on which it appeared constituted a
search. If Justice Scalia intended to refute the dissent's criticism by showing
that the police invaded privacy (or better, destroyed secrecy) when examining the turntable, then he should have added a search out analysis to his
very narrow application of the search of interpretation.
Dunn, decided the same day as Hicks, involved an energetic team of
government agents who used seemingly every investigative technique that
no longer constitutes a search to weave a net around the defendant.3 6' The
procedural history of the case shows the enormous confusion the incoherence of current fourth amendment law has created in the lower courts; the
same appellate panel, in three different opinions, changed its mind twice
on the reason why the government's action was a search.3 62 The Dunn
decision demonstrates the serious dangers the Court creates when it is not
fully aware of the semantic implications of the language it uses.
The story in Dunn began when government agents learned that one of
the defendants, Carpenter, had ordered large quantities of equipment and
chemicals of the type manufacturers of illegal drugs often use.3 63 The
agents obtained a warrant to install beepers in an electric hot plate stirrer
and two chemical containers, which Carpenter had ordered and subse359. Id. at 1152 (emphasis added).
360. Id. at 1153.
361. The case would have been a wonderfully challenging final examination question for an
advanced criminal procedure class. Perhaps, though, it would have been an unfairly difficult
question. After all, our leading fourth amendment commentator, Wayne LaFave, only months
before Dunn was reversed, praised the Fifth Circuit's decision in Dunn in his 1987 treatise
edition as "quite correct[ ]," W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.3(e), at 409, and "[f]ully consistent
with Oliver," id. § 2.4(b), at 429.
362. The district court had denied the defendants' motion to suppress evidence obtained
pursuant to the search warrant on the grounds that the warrant was based on a prior illegal
search. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1138. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding
that the agents conducted an illegal search because they entered the curtilage of Dunn's house
when they walked up to the barn. United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982).
As if anticipating the future history of the case, the court entitled its discussion of this issue
"The Fourth Amendment Conundrum." Id. at 1098.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light
of Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). United States v. Dunn, 467 U.S. 1201 (1984).
Following remand, the Fifth Circuit decided that the barn was outside the curtilage of the
farmhouse, United States v. Dunn, 766 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1984), but that Dunn had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn itself and its contents, which the agents violated
when they looked through the netting into the barn. Id. at 886. After the Fifth Circuit duly
denied its petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc, the government again petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari. Five weeks after the certiorari petition was filed, the Fifth
Circuit took the extraordinary step of vacating its own judgment sua sponte without any
explanation. United States v. Dunn, 781 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1986). A few weeks later the Fifth
Circuit issued a three paragraph opinion in which it stated:
We again have examined painstakingly the facts reflected in this record .... Upon
studied reflection, we now conclude and hold that the barn was inside the protected
curtilage. Accordingly, we reinstate the opinion rendered on May 7, 1982, reported
at 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982), as our disposition of this appeal by Ronald Dale
Dunn.
United States v. Dunn, 782 F.2d 1226, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986).
363. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1137.
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quently purchased. The beeper signals revealed that the two drums were on
Carpenter's truck when he arrived at Dunn's ranch a week or so later.
Aerial photographs of the ranch that the agents took showed Carpenter's
truck backed up to. a barn behind the ranch house. The agents made a
364
warrantless entry onto the ranch that evening.
A perimeter fence completely encircled the 198 acre ranch.365 The
agents crossed the perimeter fence and another interior fence. They
approached the barn where the truck was parked, crossing two barbed wire
fences and climbing over a wooden fence that enclosed the front portion of
the barn.3 66 They still could not see into the barn because a fishnet type
material covered the space between the top of waist-high gates and the barn
ceiling. 6 7 Even when the agents walked up to the netting, they had to use
a flashlight to peer through the netting.366 They then saw the defendants'
drug laboratory inside the barn. The next day a magistrate issued a warrant
based on the agents' observations, and government officials executed the
369 The officials seized chemicals,
warrant two days after its issuance.
37 0
equipment, and amphetamines.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, held that the agents
conducted no search because they neither entered a curtilage nor violated
a reasonable expectation of privacy.3 7 1 The Court directed most of its
attention to the problem of defining the outer limits of curilage. 372 The
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. The agents had first walked around the back and sides of the barn, which were not
enclosed by the wooden fence, but could not see inside. Dunn, 766 F.2d at 883.
367. As the Court of Appeals described the view: "To see inside the barn it was necessary
to stand immediately next to the netting. From as little as a few feet distant, visibility into the
barn was obscured by the netting and slatting." Id.
368. Dunn, 107 S,Ct. at 1137-38.
369. Id. at 1138. The agents entered the ranch two more times before they obtained the
warrant. Id. They made a fourth warranless entry the day after they obtained the warrant
before finally executing the warrant. Id. It would seem that the warrant should perhaps have
been called only a seizure warrant since the agents felt free to do all the searching they wanted
without using it.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1140.41.
372. Rejecting the government's proposed bright line rule that would have limited curtilage
to the area within the nearest fence to the house -although the agents crossed a number of
fences to reach the barn, there was yet another fence between the barn and the ranchhouse
that remained uncrossed-Justice White promulgated a four-factor analysis for determining
whether an area was within curtilage: (1) the proximity of the area to the home, (2) whether
the area iswithin a fence around the home, (3) "the nature of the uses to which the area is put,"
and (4) the steps taken to protect the area from observation by people passing by. See id. at
1139. He then dealt a fatal blow to Justice Powell's optimistic prediction in Oliver that the
"clarity of the open fields doctrine" would prevent the need for case-by-case definition because
"the conception defining the curtilage ...is a familiar one easily understood." Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984). Having set forth these four factors, Justice White
admitted that even these "analytical tools" do not necessarily yield a "correct" answer to what
is curtilage. See Dunn, 107 S.Ct. at 1139. Rather, the ultimate decision turns on "whether the
area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the
home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 1139. The Court thus succeeded
in making "curtilage," an archaic word with little "common sense" to begin with, even more
vague. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 137, § 2.3(d), at 403 (curtilage a "curious concept ...
originally taken to refer to the land and buildings within the baron's stone walls").
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Court's assumption that the case was about a search of the environs of a
home caused this struggle to define curtilage. The agents' just seeing into
the barn, however, independent of their physical entry into the barnyard,
deserved separate consideration under the search out interpretation. After
all, Dunn certainly was complaining about the discovery of his laboratory,
not merely the fact that the agents were tramping around his barnyard.
Justice White refused, however, to consider using a search out interpretation as revealed by his simplistic search of interpretation:3 73 no search took
the barn, nor .. .any other
place because "the officers never entered
3 74
structure on respondent's premises.
Justice White needed the search of interpretation to deflect the force
of the dissent's argument that a search took place even if the barn was not
part of the curtilage of the ranchhouse. 375 Unlike Oliver and Dow Chemical
Co.,376 the area viewed in Dunn was not visible from any public vantage
point, but instead was the interior of a private commercial structure that
was protected by the fourth amendment regardless of its proximity to a
home, or the absence of domestic activities within. Justice White appeared
to concede this point, but limited such protection to literal searches of: "We
may accept, for the sake of argument, respondent's submission that his barn
enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection [as an essential part of his business]
3 77
and could not be entered and its contents seized without a warrant.
Justice White, to support his reliance on search of analysis, then
employed a medley of precedents in which the Court had obscured the
search out interpretation with an overlay of search of or intrusion interpretations. He interpreted Oliver as holding that an observation is not a
search unless the observer in taking his vantage point has already violated
the fourth amendment.3 78 He invoked Ciraolo as authority for the proposition that the nature of what is observed, even if located within a structure
protected by the fourth amendment against entry, is irrelevant: "the fact
that the objects observed by the officers lay within an area that we have
assumed, but not decided, was protected by the Fourth Amendment does
not affect our conclusion. 3 79 Finally, Justice White confidently stated that
see
through the netting did not transform the
the use of flashlights to 38
0
observation into a search.

373. Justice White only concurred in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), because
he thought the case could be resolved on plain language grounds without reference to
expectations of privacy. See id. at 184 (White, J., concurring).
374. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1141.
375. See id.at 1146 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
376. See supra text accompanying notes 257-66 and 318-35.
377. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1140 (emphasis added).
378. Justice White stated, "Under Oliver and Hester, there is no constitutional difference
between police observations conducted while in a public place and while standing in open
fields." Id. at 1141.
379. Id. Justice White blithely quoted the passage from Ciraolo, saying the fourth
amendment" 'has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares,' "id. at 1141 (quoting California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)), without acknowledging that the agents in Dunn were hardly on a
public thoroughfare when they declined to shield their eyes at Dunn's barn gates.
380. See id.(citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), and United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559 (1927)); see also discussion of Brown and Lee, supra note 292.
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Dunn seems to represent a repudiation of Katz that is far more
profound than any of the Court's other post-Katz decisions. Although many
previous cases distorted and limited Katz by notions of legitimacy, standing,
and protected areas, the Court always had felt obliged to defend its
decisions in terms of at least an arguable absence of privacy expectations. 3 8 '
Perhaps Hoffa should have expected his friend to be a spy. Perhaps Smith
should have known that the numbers he dialed on his telephone were no
secret. Perhaps Miller should have expected that using a bank was equivalent to giving the government his financial records. Perhaps Oliver 382 and
Ciraolo should have known the police could see their marijuana gardens
from the air. Perhaps Dow should have realized that the design of its plant
could be obtained by anyone willing to hire an aerial mapping company.
But surely "society" would recognize as reasonable Dunn's expectation that
no one would be standing at his barn gates looking through that deliberately placed netting without his permission.
Even assuming that Dunn knew the fourth amendment did not
prohibit government agents from trespassing on his ranch and crossing
four fences to reach his barn, he was entitled to rely on his well-established
state law rights to keep uninvited people off his land, especially fenced land.
The contents of his barn simply were not visible from any point where the
government had a right to be, including an aerial perspective from any
angle or proximity. The combination of the translucent netting and interior
darkness presumably would have defeated even an attempt to look into the
barn from a distant point outside his fenced property using binoculars or
383
more sophisticated technological aids.
The only way the Dunn decision "makes sense" is to assume that
searching out no longer is a possible meaning under the fourth amendment, unless perhaps the secret is located within the four walls of a
home. 38 4 Only an entry to a protected area would seem to be a search, since
that was the only factor missing in Dunn. Under Justice White's reasoning,
the fourth amendment would not have been implicated had the agents
overheard an incriminating conversation in the barn when they ap381. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), is perhaps the strongest example of the
Codrt's former need to pay at least lip service to Katz. Even after concluding in two concise
paragraphs that the plain language of the fourth amendment resolved the case, id. at 176-77,
Justice Powell felt obliged to demonstrate over the next seven pages that any expectation of
privacy Oliver expected was not legitimate. See id. at 177-84.
382. One argument used by Justice Powell in Oliver was that Oliver conceded the
government could have lawfully viewed his marijuana garden from the air and hence could
have had no reasonable expectation that the garden was secret. See id. at 179 n.9.
383. Justice Scalia at oral argument raised this hypothetical variant, asking Dunn's lawyer,
"Would it have been okay for the police to look into the barn with binoculars from outside the
fence?" 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 4162-63 (Feb. 11, 1987). The response is an intriguing
example of one person's perception of the disparity between society's normative judgments
and "legitimate" expectations of privacy: "I wouldn't say it was okay, but it would probably pass
constitutional muster." Id.
384. The presence of a secret within the curtilage is no protection against searching out, see
Dunn, 107 S.Ct. at 1141 (relying on Ciraolo for proposition that even curtilage not protected
from police observation), and being concealed from observation by thefour walls of a structure
on private property is no protection if the structure is nonresidential. Id. (relying on United
States v. Lee, 247 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) to validate flashlight search of barn).
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proached the gates.3 85 The same conclusion would follow if they left a
listening device at the gate and later overheard people at work in the
laboratory. 386 Yet, does not this last hypothetical come back full circle to the
very facts of Katz: use of a listening device without actual invasion of a
protected area to defeat reasonable privacy expectations?
The Dunn decision contains no clue that the Court saw itself making
such a radical shift in fourth amendment doctrine. Indeed, the Court
seemed more harmonious than on prior occasions. Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Stevens joined the majority opinion without a single concurring
reservation.38 7 Only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. 388 Even their
dissent lacked, for example, the harsh accusations made by Justice Powell in
Dow Chemical Co. and Ciraolo about the repudiation of Katz.3 89 Once again
the Court seemed unaware of the effect caused by relying on one semantic
approach rather than another. Thus, Dunn powerfully demonstrates how
important it can be for judges to be conscious and precise in the way they
use language.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Court's shift in the last eight years from the vagueness of the
legitimacy rule, represented by cases such as Miller39 0 and Smith, 391 to the
incoherence of its most recent decisions can be seen paradoxically as a
potentially healthy development in fourth amendment jurisprudence.
Katz3 9 2 marked the end of a struggle to discuss and decide the just listening
cases within the conceptual limitations generated by the semantic features
of search of. When the Court decided in Katz to include at least some kinds
of listening within the scope of the fourth amendment, it needed new
language to explain and apply the decision. But in its post-Katz decisions
the Court evaded rather than met that challenge by reinterpreting Katz
through use of the "legitimate expectation of privacy" rule. As Edward Levi
has pointed out, when a traditional legal concept breaks down under the
pressure of change, often "there will be the attempt to escape to some
overall rule which can be said to have always operated and which will make
the reasoning look deductive."3 93 The redefinition of "search" as "the
385. That is, the amendment would not have been implicated unless the presence of people
within the barn holding a conversation is the kind of "intimate activity" that would have made
the barn a sufficient extension of Dunn's home life to temporarily convert the barnyard into
curtilage. Compare Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1140 (White, J.) with id. at 1141-42 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
386. This is hardly an extravagant extension of the facts. On one of the return visits after
the initial evening reconnaissance (while the warrant application was being prepared), the
agents covertly installed an "electronic surveillance device" on the barn gate. Dunn, 674 F.2d
at 1097. The device only detected the passage of vehicles and persons past the gate, however,
and was "not designed to intercept conversations." Id. at 1097 n.3.
387. See id. at 1136.
388. See id. at 1142-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
389. See supra text accompanying notes 304-17 and 336-45.
390. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
391. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
392. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
393. E. LEvi, AN INRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 9 (1948).
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infringement of a legitimate expectation of privacy" is just such a rule. But,
as Levi wrote, this turn to an "overall rule" is often a pathological
development: "The rule will
be useless. It will have to operate on a level
39 4
where it has no meaning."

The challenge of expanding or altering a legal concept such as
"search" must be met with a legal vocabulary that is more, and not less,
meaningful. However, the process of infusing new meaning into words
resembles organic growth-like nurturing a seed into a tree or raising an
infant into adulthood. Change is gradual and subtle; apparent halts and
setbacks mask underlying progress. The mature result is more vast and
complex than the beginning point, yet3 95
the very nature of the growth
process provides identity and continuity.
Vagueness creates the illusion of expanded meaning, hence the
temporary appeal of "overall rules" like the legitimacy rule. But like the
biblical seeds that fell into shallow soil and sprouted rapidly only to wither
and die, rules that are not based on a sound foundation of meaning will
neither bear fruit nor endure. When the Court said that using spies,
examining bank records, and employing pen registers infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy, no one could really understand what the Court
was saying without knowing what was meant by legitimate. If, as the Court
has sometimes explicitly stated, legitimacy turns on a balancing of privacy
and law enforcement interests, nonetheless, that balancing must be expressed in language we can understand and apply to new situations.39 6
Perhaps if the legitimacy rule was supported by a wealth of decisions dearly
and consistently articulating a coherent body of fourth amendment policy,
the phrase "legitimate expectation of privacy" would have developed into3 97
a
legal term of art with an established meaning, albeit phrased inelegantly.
The very development of such a body of policy, however, has been blocked
by unreflective reliance on the vagueness of "legitimate" as a substitute for
articulated policies.

394. Id. (footnote omitted).
395. The metaphor of organic growth lies at the heart of the most famous aphorism in
American legal scholarship: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
O.W. HOLMMEs,The Common Law, in THE Comnto. LAw 1 (1881).
396. See White, supra note 208, at 171 (balancing "can only work if we have some prior
language to define what is to be subjected to that process"). Of course, the fourth amendment
itself is the result of such balancing, but it is vastly more meaningful than a mere statement
that "the people's right of legitimate privacy shall not be unreasonably infringed." Compare
the clarity of the fourth amendment text with the vagueness ofJustice Powell's paraphrase in
Dow Chemical Co., 106 S. Ct. at 1827 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Fourth Amendment protects
private citizens from arbitrary surveillance by their government.").
397. For example, the framers intentionally chose the vague word "unreasonable" in
drafting the first clause of the fourth amendment. Yet, at least until recently, most competent
speakers of American legal language had a good understanding of what made a warrantless
search unreasonable: absence of exigent circumstances, consent, or an administrative inspection scheme justifying the search. In turn, the terms "exigent circumstances," "consent," and
"administrative search" have developed well-understood specialized meanings in the fourth
amendment context. This growth of meaning was made possible by the articulation of dear
policies underlying the warrant requirement which have infused meaning into the previously
vague word "unreasonable." One of the ironies of current fourth amendment law is that in the
phrase "unreasonable searches," the meaning of "searches" is now less clear than "unreasonable."

A SEARCH FOR COMMON SENSE
The incoherence of the Court's more recent decisions may be a sign of
returning vitality because they signal an effort to fill the vacuum left by the
legitimacy rule with common sense meanings. As the preceding section
demonstrates, at least incoherent opinions like Dow3 9 8 and Ciraolo3 99 may be
rendered potentially meaningful by eliminating excess, inconsistent meanings. Perhaps the Court only needs the tools of semantic analysis to
transform the current tangle of fourth amendment law into healthy
growth.
One function of semantic analysis is to identify sloppy and confusing
speech and thus ward off vagueness, ambiguity, and incoherence. Merely
clearing our fourth amendment law of such clutter aids a return to healthy
growth. But semantic analysis can nurture as well as prune. Language is the
vital fiber of the law, giving its abstract concepts substance and the potential
for growth. The pathological use of the policy interpretation to produce the
sterile and vacuous legitimacy rule demonstrates that insensitivity to
semantics can deprive legal reasoning of vitality. Great judges are not only
wise policymakers and learned scholars; they are also masters of language.
Semantic analysis makes such mastery more accessible to all by rendering
explicit native understanding of our own language.
The task now before the Court is to revive the meaning of "search"to resolve the current confusion without retreating to vagueness or ambiguity. Unless the Court chooses to overrule Katz, it is clear that the meaning
of "search" cannot be limited to "search of" or "intrude." Thus, the
approach that seems to offer the best articulation of Katz as well as a
principled way of analyzing the decisions made in its wake would combine
both search of and search out interpretations in a common sense way. This
common sense approach would indicate that a government action was a
search either if agents conducted a search of houses, persons, papers, or
effects400 or if they search out objectively secret information. Thus, semantic common sense would clarify the textual ambiguity, resolve vagueness by
tapping the vast resources of everyday meaning, and prevent incoherence
caused by distorting the common sense meaning of "search" or confusing
its different senses in a single expression. The common sense approach
would not exclude policy discussions from constitutional interpretation.
Rather, the semantic features and connotations of "search" can provide a
structure for discussing policy implications as well as furnishing an under40 1
standable medium for communicating the decision made.
398. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
399. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
400. This approach would also use common sense to interpret "houses, persons, papers,
and effects," for example, by including yards (not "curtilages") within the right to be secure in
houses, on the ground that the common semantic feature [lived in place] was more important
than the feature a yard lacks [has a roof]. See supra text accompanying notes 261-63 (discussion
of curtilage).
401. Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz can be viewed as a skilled expression of
constitutional policy through the use of common sense language. The decision to deny fourth
amendment protection to merely subjective expectations of secrecy obviously had significant
policy justifications, yet Harlan expressed his decision with common sense notions of secrecy.
Thus, the object of search out under his Katz concurrence must be more than hard to find; it
must be objectively secret as measured by the steps the reasonable person would take to
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A semantically sophisticated reworking of "search" may eventually go
beyond the commmon sense approach. Few of our operative legal terms
rely entirely on common sense; some, like "tort" and "due process," are
built entirely from purely legal contexts of use. But if "search" in the fourth
amendment is to become such a specialized legal term of art, then the
courts have an enormous creative task before them. As Owen Barfield, a
lawyer and literary critic, once noted, "there is all the difference in the
world between the propagation of a doctrine and the creation of a
meaning. '40 2 The enormity of the task will be lessened-and fourth
amendment law rendered more comprehensible to the average citizen-if
semantic analysis enables courts to use common sense meanings of "search"
as at least the raw material for a newly
refined and powerful meaning of
"search" in the fourth amendment. 403
preserve secrecy-a standard that conforms to our common sense understanding of "secret."
402. 0. BARFnELD, Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction, in EsSAYs P.EsErw TO CHARLMS WILUANIs 106,
121 (C.S. Lewis ed. 1947); cf E. LEvI,supra note 393, at 9 (legal system "does not work with the
rule but on a much lower [i.e., fundamental] level").
403. As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court decided that the fourth
amendment does not prohibit warrantless searches of garbage left for collection outside the
curtilage of a home, Californiav. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988). Both the majority
opinion by Justice White and the dissent by Justice Brennan in Greenwood are flawed by failure
to distinguish clearly between the two different types of searches that occurred: the search of
defendant's garbage bag and the consequent searching out of specific information (that
defendant had discarded items indicative of narcotic use). See 108 S. Ct. at 1627. Under the
common sense approach, the mere physical activity of rummaging through the discarded
garbage bag (the search o]) did not implicate Greenwood's fourth amendment rights because
the only affected object was the garbage bag, which was not a sacred area such as a house, a
person's body, or a repository of personal effects. (The dissents attempted anaolgy to cases
involving containers of personal effects, id. at 1632-33, failed to recognize this distinction.)
However, the searching out of information regarding narcotic use would fall within the fourth
amendment if that information was objectively secret.
Whether a reasonable person would expect information to remain secret if examination of
discarded garbage could reveal the information is a more subtle and variable issue than either
the majority or dissent acknowledged. Was it reasonable for Greenwood to believe that his
drug use was a secret even though he discarded narcotics paraphenalia in his trash? The
answer turns on the likelihood that whoever might find the paraphenalia would have both the
interest and ability to trace it back to Greenwood. The curbside scavenger or nosy child
hypothesized by the majority, id. at 1628-29, would lack the interest, while anyone who found
the paraphenalia after the trash was mixed into the truck bin would be unable to make the
connection between it and Greenwood. The only real risk to his secret was what actually
happened: a deliberate surveillance of his trash achieved by intercepting garbage collection
before the bag was dumped. Unlike the risk that routine police helicopter patrols would
discover a large marijuana plot in an urban backyard, see discussion of Ciraolo, supra text
accompanying notes 311-17, the risk of trash surveillance does not seem sufficiently likely to
make Greenwood's secrecy expectations objectively unreasonable.
By holding that discovery of information through examining discarded trash could never be
a fourth amendment search, the majority in Greenwood made the same error found in Oliver
and Dunn, discussed supra text accompanying notes 264-66 and 384-89: it assumed simply
because the area affected by the search ofwas not protected that any information searched out by
that activity was likewise unprotected. The implications of the Court's generic exclusion of
"trash searches" from the fourth amendment meaning of search are very troubling. Imagine,
for example, a far more sophisticated form of trash surveillance, that went to the extent of
reconstructing shredded documents. This would be a daunting but achievable task, as proved
by the Iranian reconstruction of shredded documents from the American embassy during the
1979 hostage incident. Surely it is reasonable to expect the contents of confidential shredded
documents to be as secret as words uttered into a telephone mouthpiece, yet the holding in
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Greenwood would allow the government to destroy this expectation without any justification or
limitation. (The trash surveillance could be directed against the offices of a lawyer opposing
the government in a case, of a civil rights leader, or of an opposing political party, and be motivated by entirely improper purposes.) Perhaps the Court would have reached a different result
if presented with such facts, but unfortunately semantic confusion makes it impossible to limit
the holding in Greenwood so as to still exert fourth amendment control over such an
Iranian-style "trash search."
One can only hope that the Court does not make an error of even greater potential gravity
by holding that urine analysis and other drug testing techniques are not "searches" and
therefore entirely beyond the scope of fourth amendment controls in the two drug testing
cases set for argument during the 1988-89 term. See National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988), set for oral
argument, 57 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1988) (No. 87-1879) (argument scheduled for Nov.
2, 1988); Railway Labor Executives Ass'n v. Buruley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 108
S. Ct. 2033 (1988), set for oral argument, 57 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1988) (No. 87-1555)
(argument scheduled for Nov. 2, 1988). The key first step in the drug testing cases is to
distinguish between whether there has been a search of the person's body and whether
objectively secret information has been searched out. If testing were done by physicians bound
by a confidential professional relation to the government employee and the only mandate
imposed on the employee was to obtain that doctor's certificate of a drug-free state, it might
well be that the government would engage in neither a search of or a searching out, thus
accomplishing its objective of assuring a drug-free work force while avoiding the dangerous
enterprise of trying to create a drug testing exception to the fourth amendment.

